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COMMENT
INSTANT REPLAY: A REVIEW OF THE CASE
OF MAURICE CLARETT, THE APPLICATION
OF THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR
EXEMPTION, AND ITS PROTECTION OF THE
NFL DRAFT ELIGIBILITY RULE
John R. Gerba*
INTRODUCTION

Maurice Clarett wants to play in the National Football League
("NFL"). 1 He feels that he is physically mature and skilled enough to
do so.' The fact that he led his college team, The Ohio State
University, to a national championship as a true freshman 3 only adds
credence to his belief. He is not alone in believing himself ready to
compete in the NFL. Numerous commentators and NFL playerpersonnel executives also feel that Clarett is ready for the NFL.4
While there were varied opinions on when Clarett might have been
selected in the 2004 NFL draft had he been deemed eligible, most
predictions had him being drafted no later than the third round.'

* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. This Comment is
dedicated to the memory of Edward Joseph Schmeltz (1986-2005). The "best kid" I
have ever had the pleasure of knowing. His work ethic, desire, and relentless pursuit
of his goals has and will continue to serve as a shining example to all of us lucky
enough to have known him.
1. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
2. Id.
3. The term "true freshman" refers to a college athlete who is in his first year of
both athletic and academic eligibility. It is common for college football players to
"redshirt" a year, during which they go through a year of school with limited athletic
participation. A redshirt freshman would be in his first year of athletic eligibility but
his second year academically.
4. See Thomas George, Players Leaving College Early Are the Class of the N.F.L.
Draft, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2004, at D6; Mark Maske, Clarett's Stock Iffy in NFL
Running Backs Market, Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 2004, at D1; Gene Wojciechowski, Good
to Go, ESPN the Magazine, Oct. 28, 2002, at 70.
5. Maske, supra note 4.
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The NFL, however, has long had an eligibility rule that restricts
when an amateur athlete is eligible for the annual draft.6 Since 1990,
this rule has required that all draft applicants be three years removed
from their high school graduation.7 The eligibility rule prohibited
Clarett from entering the draft, and he responded by bringing suit in
federal court challenging the rule as a violation of antitrust law.8 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
found that the rule violated the antitrust laws, and that the nonstatutory labor exemption offered it no protection.9 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption shielded the rule from antitrust liability. 10
Part I of this Comment provides the necessary background for
understanding both the antitrust issues raised by this case and the
non-statutory labor exemption. Part II of this Comment examines the
Clarett decisions11 and the issues that they present regarding the
applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption and the operation
of antitrust laws. Part III argues that the Second Circuit's Clarett
decision was incorrect under existing non-statutory exemption case
law, and proposes a new requirement to help govern the applicability
of the non-statutory labor exemption.
I. ANTITRUST LIABILITY AND THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR
EXEMPTION

Maurice Clarett has challenged the NFL's eligibility rule as a
violation of the Sherman Act. l" The Sherman Act is an antitrust
The non-statutory
statute that prohibits restraints on trade. 3
exemption, however, removes some union-employer agreements from
the operation of antitrust law.14 If the exemption is inapplicable and
antitrust law controls, two threshold requirements must be met-an
agreement between parties and an effect on interstate commerce-to
invoke a Sherman Act analysis.15 Once the threshold requirements
are met, courts will generally employ the "rule of reason," which
declares that unreasonable restraints on trade are violations of the
6. Clarett,369 F.3d at 126.
7. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 385.
8. Id. Antitrust law generally prohibits restraints on trade and commerce. See
infra Part I.A.
9. Clarett,306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
10. See Clarett,369 F.3d at 125.
11. There are two decisions in this case. The district court decision granted
Clarett entry into the draft. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 379. The Second Circuit
decision overturned the district court and upheld the NFL's eligibility rule. Clarett,
369 F.3d at 124.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
14. See infra Part I.B.1.
15. See infra Part I.A.2.
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Sherman Act. 6 However, some agreements have been declared to be

per se violations of the Sherman Act, eliminating the need for any
inquiry into their reasonableness.17
Part I.A addresses the antitrust issues implicated by Clarett, and
Part I.B delves into the nature and applicability of the non-statutory
labor exemption.
A. Antitrust
Antitrust law finds its early roots in English common law. 8 The

United States first passed antitrust legislation in 18909 in the form of

the Sherman Act,20 which is a statute prohibiting restraints of trade on
interstate commerce." The generality of the statute left much of the
development of antitrust law up to judicial decisions. 2
Antitrust law has had a profound impact on professional sports.2 3
The NFL has had to defend antitrust suits over sixty times between
1966 and 1991.24 In addition, two of the three other major sports
leagues, 5 as well as a number of now-defunct sports leagues,2 6 have
frequently faced antitrust challenges.27

16. See infra Part I.A.3.
17. See infra Part I.A.3.
18. See Phillip Areeda & Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text,
Cases 38-41 (5th ed. 1997).
19. Id. at 43, 52.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
21. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 18, at 4.
22. Id. The fact that there is no federal agency charged with administering the
antitrust laws could also have led to its predominantly judicial development.

23. Gary R. Roberts, Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, in The Business

of Professional Sports 135 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., 1991).
24. Id.; see, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1295 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the non-statutory labor exemption shielded the NFL's free agent compensation rule
from antitrust attack); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385,
1390, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding an NFL rule requiring that three-quarters of the
member teams approve any move of a team into the home territory of another team
in violation of the Sherman Act); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175-76
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding the NFL draft, which, as then constituted, prohibited
drafted players who could not agree on a contract with the team that drafted them
from ever playing in the NFL, was an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of
the Sherman Act); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding the
NFL rule requiring compensation for the signing of another team's free agent an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act); Zimmerman v. NFL,
632 F. Supp. 398, 401 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that the non-statutory labor exemption
shielded from antitrust liability a supplemental draft held by the NFL for players
already under contract to another professional football league); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F.
Supp. 73, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding certain employment restraints used by the NFL
unreasonable restraints of trade not shielded by the non-statutory labor exemption
because there was no agreement in place at the time of the alleged violations).
25. For the purpose of this Comment, "major sports leagues" include the NFL,
Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National
Hockey League.
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A large part of antitrust law derives from the first two sections of

the Sherman Act. 2 The first section makes it illegal to contract or
combine in the restraint of trade among the states or with a foreign
nation. 29 The second section outlaws monopolies."

One of these

sections, if not both, is implicated in virtually all sports-related
antitrust cases.31

Generally, there are two types of antitrust cases brought against

professional sports leagues. 2 The first involves disputes arising
between leagues or between member teams of a league.33 The second

arises when someone challenges an action of a league as an illegal
conspiracy among the member clubs in violation of section 1 of the

Sherman Act.34 This second type is the more common and more often
litigated of the two.35
In order to succeed in an antitrust challenge, a plaintiff must show
an "antitrust injury."36 Once this standing has been established, a

court must determine if the alleged behavior violates antitrust law.37
Part I.A.1. examines the qualifications of an "antitrust injury," Part
I.A.2. discusses the requirement for the application of the antitrust
laws, Part I.A.3 addresses the rule of reason (the standard by which
alleged violations are judged), and Part I.A.4 presents the relevant

sports related antitrust cases.

26. Defunct sports leagues that have been sued on antitrust grounds include the
World Hockey Association, American Basketball Association, and the United States
Football League.
27. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 135. The lone exception among major sports
leagues is Major League Baseball which enjoys a broad exemption to the antitrust
laws. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam); see also
infra Part I.A.2.a.
28. 15 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (2000); see also Roberts, supra note 23, at 135.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (stating that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal").
30. Id. § 2 (stating that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony").
31. Roberts, supra note 23, at 135.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see infra Parts I.A.4, I.B.3.b-c.
35. Roberts, supra note 23, at 135. This is also the type of antitrust challenge
brought by Clarett. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert.
filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
36. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); see also
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977).
37. See infra Part I.A.2.
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1. Antitrust Injury
An antitrust injury is one "of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful."38 It is not sufficient to merely prove an injury which is
"casually linked to an illegal presence in the market."3 9 For an injury
to qualify as an antitrust injury it "should reflect the anticompetitive
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible
by the violation. '"40

The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors that are
relevant when assessing the antitrust standing of a particular

plaintiff.41 These factors include (1) the causal connection between

the antitrust violation and the injury,42 (2) the nature of the plaintiff's

injury,43 (3) the "directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,"" (4)
the existence of a more direct party that would be motivated to

challenge the alleged violation,45 and (5) the interest in avoiding
duplicate recoveries or complex apportionment of damages.46

38. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 537-44 (1983).
42. Id. at 537. Although there must be a causal connection between the alleged
violation and the plaintiff's injury, this relationship is not sufficient to invoke antitrust
standing. It does, however, weigh in favor of recognizing the standing of a particular
plaintiff. Id. The analysis under this factor is very similar to the overall analysis of
antitrust injury discussed above.
43. Id. at 538. This inquiry is largely one that looks to the legislative history and
the intent of Congress. See id.; see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
484 (1982) (concluding that the plaintiff's injury "falls squarely within the area of
congressional concern"). The case for standing grows stronger when the plaintiff's
injury is one that Congress intended to be covered by the antitrust laws. However,
this intent should be clearly expressed as the congressional purpose. See Brunswick
Corp., 429 U.S. at 488; Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
44. Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540. An injury which is merely an
indirect result of the harm that may result from an alleged violation does not weigh in
favor of finding antitrust standing. See id. at 540-41.
45. Id. at 542. This factor becomes relevant in cases where an organization, such
as a union, is bringing an antitrust challenge. The existence of a class of persons likely
to bring the antitrust challenge alleviates the need to allow the more remote
organization or party to bring the challenge. Finding a plaintiff to lack standing in
this situation will "not [be] likely to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected
or unremedied." Id. "The existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self
interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust
enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party such as the
Union to perform the office of a private attorney general." Id.
46. Id. at 543. This factor looks to questions of judicial economy. See id. at 543-44.
Complex apportionment of damages will "often require additional long and
complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories."
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).
Similarly, the chance of duplicate recoveries will cause courts to spend time and
energy evaluating damage claims, thus undermining the effectiveness of the suit in the
first place. See Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 544.
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2. Statutory Triggers
If a claimant has standing, the statutory language of the Sherman
Act sets up two threshold requirements. Before a Sherman Act
analysis can take place there must be an effect on interstate
commerce, and an agreement between parties. 7
a. Effect on Interstate Commerce
The requirement of an effect on interstate commerce brings the
Sherman Act under the Commerce Clause powers of Congress.48 The
broad judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause has provided a
far reach to the antitrust laws. 9 Most modern businesses fall under
the contemporary definition of interstate commerce. °
Professional sports were originally viewed as local in nature, and
thus outside the purview of the federal antitrust laws.5 This view,
however, was promulgated in the 1920s at a time when the only
popular professional sport was baseball. 2 As the other sports leagues
developed and expanded their operations, the effect on interstate
commerce increased. 3 Thus in 1954, the issue was revisited by the
Supreme Court, which limited application of its earlier decision to
baseball only. 54 That decision, Toolson v. New York Yankees, was not
based on baseball's lack of an effect on interstate trade, but rather on
the congressional silence on the issue since the earlier ruling.
Because baseball had been allowed to develop for thirty years under
the assumption that it was immune from antitrust laws, the Court
reasoned that any change in policy should be the result of
congressional action and not judicial decree. 6

47. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal.
1971); see also Fort Wayne Telsat v. Entm't and Sports Programming Network, 753 F.
Supp. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
48. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 18, at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208-09 (1922) (holding that the interstate travel of sports teams did not change their
local nature).
52. See Michael Jay Kaplan, Annotation, Application of FederalAntitrust Laws to
ProfessionalSports, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 489, 495 (1974).
53. See id.
54. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per curiam).
This case resulted in the continuation of the antitrust exemption baseball still enjoys.
For a discussion of baseball's antitrust exemption, see William B. Gould IV, Labor
Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15
Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 61 (2004).
55. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356-57.
56. Id.
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Since then, the Court has repeatedly applied the antitrust laws to

professional sports.5 7 The NFL, in particular, has been involved in

numerous antitrust actions over the years, and the courts have
consistently declined to even analyze the effect of the league's
business on interstate commerce.5 ' This suggests that the courts have
thought it obvious that the NFL is involved in interstate commerce. 9
b. Agreement Between Parties
The agreement necessary for a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act "may be found when 'the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a

common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an
unlawful arrangement.""'6 The wording of the Sherman Act, requiring

an agreement, a1 makes it inapplicable to unilateral action. When a
single entity acts in anticompetitive ways, it does not run afoul of
section 1 of the Sherman Act because it fails to satisfy the first
threshold requirement.62
Most common business organizations are considered single entities
and thus cannot conspire with themselves within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. 63 Employees or divisions of corporations can never
neither can partners in a
illegally conspire with each other;'
recognized partnership.6 5 The Supreme Court has even held that
wholly owned subsidiaries can never conspire with their parent

company because the basic interests of the two are identical.66 The

joint venture, however, is the single business entity that the courts
have yet67 to classify as a unilateral actor for the purposes of antitrust
liability.

57. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (holding the antitrust laws
applicable to professional football); United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236,
240-41 (1955) (holding the antitrust laws applicable t o professional boxing).
58. See Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Zimmerman v.
NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
see also Robert D. Koch, Note, 4th and Goal: Maurice Clarett Tackles The NFL
Eligibility Rule, 24 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 291, 309-10 (2004).
59. See Koch, supra note 58, at 310.
60. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)
(quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
62. See Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1986).
63. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 142.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772-73 (1984);
see also Roberts, supra note 23, at 142.
67. Roberts, supra note 23, at 142; see also NCAA v. Bd.of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).

2390

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

The NFL has attempted to avoid antitrust liability by arguing that it
is a single economic actor and thus immune from the Sherman Act.68
This argument has been rejected because the member teams in the
NFL are distinct independent business entities who compete with each
other to acquire players, and for fan support. 69 These factors
demonstrate that each team is an entity
distinct from the NFL, and
70
thus susceptible to the antitrust laws.
3. Application of Antitrust Law: The Rule of Reason
The language of the Sherman Act appears to extend antitrust
liability to all combinations in restraint of trade. 7' The Supreme
Court, however, did not adopt this interpretation.72 The Court,
instead, limited the Sherman Act to prohibit only those agreements
that were an unreasonable or undue restraint on interstate
commerce.73 "Thus, the 'rule of reason' became the standard by
which antitrust violations would be measured, and the Court
undertook to regulate rather than prohibit private combinations. 74
The rule of reason analysis looks to the contested rule's effect on
competition. 75
A reasonable rule will regulate and potentially
promote competition, not suppress and destroy it. 76 This test "is not
[meant] to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in
the
77
public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry.
There are some concerns, however, in implementing a rule of
reason standard.78 It causes judges to engage in lengthy factual
inquiries and make the type of policy-based decisions that are
indicative of legislative, not judicial, responsibilities. 79 Realizing that
this inherent difficulty will, in some cases, require such complex
computations that the cost of doing those computations may outweigh

68. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (1984).
69. Id. at 1390.
70. Id. For a complete argument as to why sports leagues should be considered
single entities, see Roberts, supra note 23, at 140-48.
71. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062-65 (C.D. Cal.
1971). The Act itself prohibits "[e]very contract.., in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
72. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062-63.
73. Id. at 1063 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
74. Id.
75. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
76. See id. In determining the legality of a challenged rule "[t]he true test ... is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." Id. (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)).
77. Id. at 692.
78. See Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063.
79. Id.
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any benefit that accrues, the Supreme Court has declared certain
practices, including group boycotts, to be per se illegal.8"
4. Relevant Antitrust Cases in Sports
The Clarett case is not the first time that these antitrust issues have
been litigated.8 1 Multiple lower court cases have focused on the
choice between using the rule of reason and the per se approach to
illegality, as well as the analysis under each. 2
a. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc. 83
In the case most factually similar to the current controversy, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
declared illegal a National Basketball Association ("NBA") eligibility
rule, which required that a prospect be four years removed from his
high school graduating class.84 Although the NBA's rule is strikingly
similar to the NFL's eligibility rule that Clarett challenges, there is
one important difference-the NBA had enacted its rule unilaterally,
thus it was not part of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").85
Since the NBA's rule was not the product of a union-employer
agreement, the non-statutory exemption offered it no protection, and

80. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court stated
the following:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more
certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity
for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group
boycotts, and tying arrangements.
Id. (citations omitted).
81. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984)
(holding the NCAA's college football television plan illegal, as an unreasonable
restraint of trade); Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that an
NHL rule prohibiting one-eyed players was reasonable under the rule of reason);
Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066-67 (holding the per se approach applicable to
the NBA's draft eligibility rule).
82. See infra Parts I.A.4.a-c.
83. 325 F. Supp. at 1049.
84. Id. at 1059.
85. See id. at 1059-60 (the court in describing the implementation of the rule
makes no mention of any agreement or even the existence of a player's union); see
also Koch, supra note 58, at 298.
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it was evaluated under antitrust law.86 The case's relevance to the
current controversy is thus limited to the operation of the antitrust
laws only if the non-statutory exemption is found inapplicable.8 7
The district court in Denver Rockets found that the antitrust laws
govern all professional sports except baseball.88 The NBA's eligibility
rule was found to constitute a primary concerted refusal to deal,
otherwise known as a group boycott.89 After finding that the action
met the two threshold requirements for the application of antitrust
law,90 the court went on to apply the per se rule of illegality for group
boycotts.9 ' Thus the NBA's draft eligibility rule was declared a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
b. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma9 3
In 1981 the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")
adopted a television plan for the 1982-1985 seasons that was intended
to minimize reductions in game attendance due to live broadcasts.94
The plan was put into contracts with both the American Broadcasting
Company ("ABC") and the Columbia Broadcasting System
("CBS"). 95 Each network was allowed to telecast fourteen games per
year in accordance with certain rules set out in the plan. 96
The plan dictated the price the networks paid to the member
schools for the rights to televise their game.97
An NCAA
representative would set a recommended price for each type of
telecast; national telecasts would be the most expensive followed by
regional telecasts and then by Division II or III games. 98 There was no
adjustment in the fee for the size of the television market, the number
of markets in which the game would be seen, or for the particular
characteristics of teams involved in the game.99 The networks would
alternate selecting games they wished to televise and would be paying

86. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066-67.
87. For a discussion of the non-statutory labor exemption, see infra Part I.B.
88. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1060.
89. Id. at 1061.
90. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
91. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
92. Id. at 1066-67.
93. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
94. Id. at 91 (describing the purpose of the plan as minimizing "the adverse effects
of live television upon football game attendance").
95. Id. at 92.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 93. The practice was not expressly spelled out in the plan, but the
Supreme Court adopted the opinion of the district court that the parties expected that
the preexisting practices would be carried out under the plan. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
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essentially a set rate that followed the recommendation of the NCAA
representative. 10

In addition to the price fixing, the plan also demanded the networks
air games of at least eighty-two different schools during each two-year
period. 10 ' No team could exceed six television appearances per year,
four nationally, and the games had to be divided evenly between the
networks.0 No NCAA member school was allowed to sell television
rights to their games outside of the NCAA plan.0 3

The Court found that this was a clear restraint of trade."' In
addition, it was a horizontal restraint,0 5 which traditionally has
invoked the per se rule of illegality. 106 The Court, however, rejected
the per se approach in favor of the rule of reason. 7 This
determination was based on the fact that college football was "an

industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if
the product is to be available at all."' 08

Under the rule of reason the Court found that the NCAA television
plan was unreasonable because it restricted, rather than enhanced,

competition. 0 9 Of importance to this determination was the fact that
the NCAA plan had significant anticompetitive effects." 0
c. Neeld v. NHL n l

Gregory Neeld was a "one-eyed hockey player" who wanted to play
in the NHL. 1 2 The NHL's by-laws contain a provision that prohibits a
player with certain visual impairments from playing." 3 The court
rejected the per se approach to illegality, instead enlisting the rule of

100. Id. (explaining that the selection would result in the network "obtain[ing] the
exclusive right to submit a bid at an essentially fixed price to the institutions
involved").
101. Id. at 94.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 98.
105. A horizontal restraint is "an agreement among competitors on the way in
which they will compete with one another." Id. at 99. The group boycott at issue in
Clarett is a type of horizontal restraint.
106. Id. at 99-100.
107. Id. at 100.
108. Id. at 101.
109. Id. at 119-20.
110. Id. at 107. Among these effects were "raising the price the networks pay for
television rights," id. at 105, "creatfing] a price structure that is unresponsive to
viewer demand and unrelated to the prices that would prevail in a competitive
market," id. at 106, "[i]ndividual competitors los[ing] their freedom to compete," id.,
and that "[p]rice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be," id. at 107.
111. 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 1298.
113. Id. By-Law 12.6 states "[a] player with only one eye, or one of whose eyes has
a vision of only three-sixtieths (3-60ths) or under, shall not be eligible to play for a
Member Club." Id. at 1298 n.1.
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reason because the primary purpose of the rule was to promote safety
and not restrain competition.114
Under the rule of reason analysis, the NHL rule was found to be
reasonable." 5 The court found that the by-law was not motivated by
anticompetiveness, and that any anticompetitive effect it might have
would be de minimis and incidental to promoting the safety of Neeld
and other players that he would be playing with and against." 6
While Denver Rockets, NCAA v. Board, and Neeld may shed some
light on the antitrust issues implicated in Clarett, they will only be
useful if the non-statutory exemption is inapplicable.
B. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption

Federal antitrust law may not govern a challenged practice if one of

two exemptions apply.117 When unions enter into agreements or
contracts with nonlabor groups, the non-statutory labor exemption
operates to allow those agreements to withstand antitrust
challenges."1 Part I.B.1 examines the congressional background and
purpose of the non-statutory exemption, Part I.B.2 presents the
Supreme Court case law regarding the exemption, and Part I.B.3

provides lower court case law relevant to Clarett.
1. Congressional Background and Purpose
The non-statutory labor exemption was derived from the statutory
exemption"' contained in provisions of the Clayton and Norris-La
Guardia Acts.12 ' The statutory exemption provides that labor unions
are not conspiracies in restraint of trade and allows certain unilateral
The exemption does not, however, protect
union activities.' 2'

114. Id. at 1300.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Paul M. Anderson, Sports Law: A Desktop Handbook 98 (1999). The
exemption implicated by the Clarett case is the non-statutory labor exemption. See
infra Part II.A. The other exemption is the statutory labor exemption which is
contained in parts of the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts. See 15 U.S.C. § 17
(2000); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104-105, 113 (2000). The application of antitrust law is
foreclosed when labor unions undertake specific unilateral activities, including
secondary picketing and boycotts, but not when unions act in concert or by agreement
with nonlabor parties. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,621-22 (1975).
118. Anderson, supra note 117, at 98.
119. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, 1989
Duke L.J. 339, 351-52.
120. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22 (detailing the statutory exemption as being
represented in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act); see also Lock, supra note 119, at 351.
121. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22 (stating that the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia
Acts "declare that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
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agreements between employers and labor unions that restrain trade.12 2
This is where the difference between the statutory and non-statutory
exemptions lie. The statutory exemption protects certain unilateral
union activities while the non-statutory exemption protects certain
agreements between unions and nonlabor groups.2 3
Derived from the statutory exemption, the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption tracks that of its predecessor: "[T]o protect
unions and their legitimate organizing activities from antitrust
attack.' ' 124 In the context of the non-statutory exemption, this
protection preserves the union's ability to collectively bargain.12 5 In
order to achieve this goal, both bargaining parties must be protected
Thus, although the non-statutory
from antitrust exposure.126
exemption has been used to protect nonlabor groups, its original
purpose-to benefit unions-continues to influence judicial
decisions.' 27
Before Congress added the provisions establishing the statutory
exemption to the relevant statutes, courts viewed unions as a group of
competitors pursuing common goals, and thus a combination in
restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.128 The
development of the statutory exemption clearly shows congressional
intent to provide for the operation of labor unions. 129 The nonstatutory exemption30 tracks this intent when unions and employers
come to agreement.
Generally, the non-statutory exemption reflects the intersection of
federal antitrust policy and the national labor policy.' 3 ' The Supreme
Court has recognized that to effectuate the congressional labor policy
(which favors collective bargaining) in light of antitrust law
(promoting free competition in the marketplace), "some uniona limited nonstatutory
employer agreements [must] be accorded
' 32
exemption from antitrust sanctions.'
Since the purpose of shielding some agreements from the operation
of antitrust laws is to effectuate the national labor policy, it is
trade, and exempt specific union activities, including secondary picketing and
boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust laws").
122. Id. at 622 (stating that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts "do not
exempt concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties").
123. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
124. See Lock, supra note 119, at 353.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a Balance Without Balancing,35
Am. U. L. Rev. 699, 717 (1986).
129. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616,621-22 (1975).
130. Id. at 622; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236-37 (1996).
131. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.

132. Id.
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necessary to discern the limits of that policy. The policy "favor[s] free
and private collective bargaining. ' 133 However, the labor policy is not
so broad as to capture all agreements struck between labor groups and
employers, for
it is only "some" agreements that must be afforded this
34
protection.
Supreme Court precedent lends insight into the national labor
policy and the purpose of the exemption. 131 The non-statutory
exemption has been derived from statutes that were enacted "in part
to adopt the views of dissenting Justices in Duplex PrintingPress Co.
v. Deering, which.., had urged the Court to interpret broadly a...
labor exemption that Congress... had written directly into the
'
antitrust laws."136
In that case, Justice Brandeis's dissent argued for
broader protection of union activity.137 The union deserved the
broader protection because "the contest between the company and
the.., union involves vitally the interest of every person whose
cooperation is sought."' 38 In addition, the labor policy was intended
"to equalize before the law the position of workingmen and employer
as industrial combatants.' ' 13 9
In Brown v. Pro Football, the Court stated that when Congress
enacted the labor statutes, adopting the dissent in Duplex Printing,its
intent was "to prevent judicial use of antitrust law to resolve labor
disputes [because they are] normally inappropriate for antitrust law
resolution."'"
The Court went on to state that "[t]he implicit
('nonstatutory') exemption interprets the labor statutes in accordance
with this intent, namely, as limiting an antitrust court's authority to
determine, in the area of industrial conflict, what is or is not a
'reasonable' practice."''
In addition, the Court in United Mine Workers of America v.
142 when discussing the scope of the non-statutory
Pennington,
exemption, explicitly commented on the friction between antitrust law
and the national labor policy. The Court found the inquiry was based
on "harmonizing the Sherman Act with the national policy expressed
in the National Labor Relations Act of promoting 'the peaceful

133. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236.
134. See supra text accompany note 132.
135. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-43; United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965).
136. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236 (citations omitted).
137. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479 (1921) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 481.
139. Id. at 484.
140. Brown, 518 U.S. at 236.
141. Id. at 236-37.
142. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management
1 43
controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation.'
Because the Court has looked to the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") to determine the labor policy, some of its provisions are
relevant to the current controversy.'" The NLRA's statement of
findings and policies states that commerce will be benefited by
protecting collective bargaining about wages, hours, and other
working conditions and by restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees. 4 ' The Act goes on to define
"labor organization" as meaning "any organization.., in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, for dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
'
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."146
It also defines "labor dispute" as "includ[ing] any controversy
concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment.' ' 47 The Act
also sets forth an obligation on unions and employers to bargain
collectively. 4 This obligation, however, "does not compel either
1 49
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.'
2. Supreme Court Case Law Regarding the Non-Statutory Exemption
In 1965, the Supreme Court decided companion cases that
established the non-statutory labor exemption. 5 ° Although the
outcomes in the cases differed, they laid the foundation for the Court
to apply the exemption in the later cases of Connell Construction5 '
and Brown. 52

143. Id. at 665 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods., Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964)).
144. See id.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). The NLRA states that:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury,
impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by
encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
Id.
146. Id. § 152(5).
147. Id. § 152(9).
148. Id. § 158(d).
149. Id.
150. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
151. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616 (1975).
152. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
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Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea
a. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
153
Co.
The Jewel Tea controversy arose out of a collective bargaining
agreement between a butchers union and a number of grocery stores
in the greater Chicago area."5 4 The agreement provided that the meat
departments would only be open from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday
through Saturday, and prohibited the sale of meat at any other time.155
The majority of the stores accepted the terms of the union's proposal
at the end of the bargaining sessions. 5 6 Jewel Tea, however, only
signed the agreement later, under threat of a strike.157 Jewel Tea then
brought suit against the union, claiming that the night restrictions
violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 158
The Supreme Court found the alleged violations exempt from the
antitrust laws. 159 The Jewel Tea Court found that the particular hours
of the day and days of the week were well within the mandatory
6 ° As such, the
subjects of collective bargaining set out by the NLRA
161
laws.
agreement was immune from the antitrust
b. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington

62

Pennington was decided on the same day as Jewel Tea, however, the
Supreme Court declined to use the exemption they had just created.
In Pennington, a coal workers union agreed to abandon their efforts
to control the working time of the miners, not to oppose increases in
mechanization, to help fund those increases, and to impose these
terms on "all operators without regard to their ability to pay.' ' 163 In
return, the union received increased wages resulting64 from the
increases in productivity as a result of the mechanization
The Court, in declining to apply the Jewel Tea exemption, found
that a union can come to a wage agreement with a nonlabor group and
seek to apply its terms on other employers as a matter of its own
policy. 6 5 The Court, however, went on to say that "a union forfeits its

153. 381 U.S. at 676.
154. Id. at 679-80.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 680.
157. Id. at 681.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 689-90.
160. Id. at 691.
161. Id. (reasoning that "the National Labor Relations Act places beyond the reach
of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long,
employees must work").
162. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
163. Id. at 660.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 664.
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exemption from the antitrust laws when... it has agreed with one set
of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining
units."' 66 In Pennington, the objective of the agreement was to drive

the small operators out of business.'67 The fact that the agreement
was collectively bargained and concerned a mandatory subject of
bargaining was not sufficient to justify it legally. 68
c. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100169

In Connell, a steamfitters union engaged in a campaign to convince
general contractors to only hire subcontractors that had a collective
bargaining agreement with the union. 7 ' When Connell refused to
sign, the union staged a single picket causing 150 workers to walk off
the job, thereby halting construction. 171 Connell subsequently7 2signed
the agreement under protest and sued under the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the non-statutory exemption
to the agreement between Connell and the union. The Court found
that "[1]abor policy clearly does not require.., that a union have
freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who
employ its members."' 73 The Court found that the protection offered
by the statutory exemption-antitrust immunity-for unilateral union
activity was not offered by the non-statutory exemption "when a
union and74a nonlabor party agree to restrain competition in a business
market."1
175
d. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.

In 1989, the NFL decided to implement a developmental squad of
players, outside of their regular rosters, that would include up to six
first-year players all being paid the same weekly salary of $1000.176
The NFL presented the plan to the National Football League Players
Association ("NFLPA") during collective bargaining.'77 The union
refused to agree to the proposal, insisting that development squad

players receive the same benefits as regular players and be free to

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 665.
Id. at 660.
Id.
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 622-23.
518 U.S. 231 (1996).
Id. at 234.
Id.
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negotiate their own salaries.'78 After negotiations reached an impasse,
the NFL unilaterally '.mplemented the rule.179 Less than one year later
235 developmental squad members filed suit, alleging that the owner's
agreement to pay them a set wage violated the Sherman Act. is '
The Court found that the non-statutory exemption shielded the
The exemption applied to the
NFL from antitrust liability.' 8'
unilateral action of the league because "[i]t grew out of, and was
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process. It
involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate
collectively. And it concerned
only the parties to the collective'

bargaining relationship.

182

3. Lower Court Non-Statutory Exemption Cases in Sports
Although there are a limited number of Supreme Court cases that
discuss the non-statutory labor exemption, 83 there are many more in
the lower courts.'" The lower court cases that are relevant to the
current controversy are presented below.
a. Mackey v. National Football League' 85
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the non-statutory
The
exemption to an NFL free agent compensation rule.
compensation rule, known as the Rozelle Rule,8 6 provided that when
a player's contract with one team expired, any other team that wished
to sign that player would have to pay compensation to his former
team.1 87 If the teams could not agree on suitable compensation, the
Commissioner was empowered to mandate compensation in the form
of one or more draft picks. 88 The Rozelle Rule was unilaterally
imposed in 1963, and contained within the 189
1968 collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA") only by incorporation.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 235.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 250.
182. Id.
183. See supra part I.B.2.
184. For a comprehensive listing of these cases see A.S. Klein, Annotation, Union
Activities Violating The Federal Antitrust Laws-Federal Cases, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1528
(1969).
185. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
186. The rule was named after the then-Commissioner of the NFL, Alvin Ray
"Pete" Rozelle.
187. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609 n.1.
188. Id. It is important to note that the draft is an essential element in constructing
teams and ensuring they remain competitive, especially within the confines of the
salary cap. As such, the potential loss of draft picks is a major impediment and harsh
penalty.
189. Id. at 613, 616.
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The court found that although not explicitly stated in the CBA, the
Rozelle Rule was still within that agreement because it was
incorporated by reference and because the CBA stated that the free
agent rules would be unchanged. 19° The court, however, went on to
espouse a three-part test for the applicability of the non-statutory
exemption in order to reach the proper accommodation between the
antitrust laws and the labor policy: (1) the restraint must primarily
effect only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship; (2) the
agreement must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining;
and (3) the agreement must be the product of bona fide arm's-length
collective bargaining.191
In Mackey, the court held that, although the Rozelle Rule fulfilled
the first two prongs of the test, it failed the third prong. The court
found that there was not bona fide arm's-length bargaining because
the rule predated the CBA and there was no quid pro quo for its
inclusion in the CBA.192
After finding that "[tlhe union's acceptance of the status quo by the
continuance of the Rozelle Rule in the initial collective bargaining
agreements under the circumstances of this case cannot serve 1'to93
immunize the Rozelle Rule from the scrutiny of the Sherman Act,'
the court turned to the antitrust analysis. It found that the Sherman
Act was applicable but rejected the per se approach to group boycotts,
Under the rule of
choosing instead to apply the rule of reason.9
reason, the Mackey court found that the interest in maintaining
competitive balance was a legitimate purpose, but struck down the
rule because it was more restrictive than necessary to serve this
purpose. 95
b. Powell v. National Football League' 96
In Powell, the Eighth Circuit was again confronted with the Rozelle
Rule, which it previously struck down in Mackey.' 9' After the Mackey
decision, the Rozelle Rule was bargained over and appeared in the
1977 CBA.' 98 The 1982 CBA continued the Rozelle Rule, but with
substantial modifications. 99 When the 1982 CBA expired in 1987, the
NFL maintained the current state of the provisions, including the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 618-21.
Id. at 621-22.
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1298.
Id.
Id. at 1296.
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Rozelle Rule.20 0 In September 1987, after failed attempts to achieve a
new CBA, the players went on strike.20 ' The strike ended after about
a month and a half without producing a new CBA. 2 °1 The court held
that the protection of the non-statutory labor exemption survived the
bargaining impasse and thus shielded the Rozelle Rule from antitrust
laws.203
24
c. Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n 0

Wood involved a settlement agreement between the NBA and its
players from a prior suit, 2 5 which modified the college draft and

created a system of free agency for veterans.20 6 The window in which
a team owned the exclusive rights to a draftee was limited to one year,
and veterans, after their contractual obligations were fulfilled, could
sell their services to the highest bidder with their prior team having a
right to match any offer.2 7 This settlement was then incorporated into
That agreement expired before the 1982-1983
the 1980 CBA. 20
season, which began before a new agreement could be reached. 2 9 The
NBA and the NBA Players Association then reached an agreement in
The agreement
principle, just days before a strike deadline. 210
continued the one-year limit on draft rights and the free agency
system and established a minimum for individual salaries and a
minimum and maximum for aggregate team salaries.2 1' Under this
agreement, a team that had reached its maximum team allowance was
only allowed to offer its first round draft choice a one-year contract

for $75,000.212
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The union then moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the NFL
teams from abiding by the terms of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement
("CBA"), and for partial summary judgment declaring that the league's imposition of
the Rozelle Rule was no longer protected by the non-statutory exemption. Id. The
parties agreed that both the 1977 and 1982 agreements met the requirements of the
Mackey test, and that they were properly protected by the exemption. Id. at 1298-99.
The union, however, contended that the protection of the exemption ended at the
point of impasse. See id.
203. Id. at 1304. This position was further substantiated in 1996 when the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Pro Football.See supra Part I.B.2.d.
204. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
205. The settlement agreement came from an earlier antitrust action brought by
the players. In that case, the players challenged the merger of the NBA with the
American Basketball Association, as well as the college draft and other employment
practices. Id. at 957.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Leon Wood was a first round draft choice of the Philadelphia 76ers;
the 76ers team payroll exceeded the salary cap and therefore could
only offer Wood a one-year, $75,000 contract.213 Wood refused to sign
the contract and brought suit claiming that the salary cap and player
draft constituted group boycotts, in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.214
The court refused to address the legitimacy of Wood's claim under
the Sherman Act, instead holding that the non-statutory exemption
shielded the contested agreement from antitrust liability.2 15 In
applying the exemption, the court found that the NLRA espouses the
fundamental principle that employees may limit competition among
themselves through collective bargaining done by an exclusive
bargaining representative.2 16 The challenged rules were held to be
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining because they were
to 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
"intimately related
' 217
of employment.'
In addition, the court rejected Wood's claim that the draft and
salary cap were illegal because they affected parties outside the
collective bargaining unit. 18 The NLRA and the prior case law were
determined to include workers from outside the bargaining unit.2 19
Furthermore, the court recognized that restricting collective
bargaining to only those employees who were members of the
bargaining unit would destroy the incentives for employers to bargain
and cause the federal labor policy to collapse.22 ° While the court
acknowledged that this system may place newer employees at a
it found this was not at all unusual in the industrial
disadvantage,
22 1
context.

222
d. Zimmerman v. National Football League

In 1983, prior to the NFL draft, a number of collegiate football
players signed contracts with teams in the now-defunct United States
Football League ("USFL"). 223 At that time, however, the USFL had

213. Id. at 958.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 959.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 962 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000)).
218. Id. at 960-61.
219. Id. at 960.
220. Id. at 961. If new employees could challenge agreements made between
employers and collective bargaining representatives it would expose employers to
suits for treble damages and destroy their incentives to collectively bargain in the first
place. Id.
221. Id.at 962.
222. 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
223. Id. at 401.
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begun to distinguish itself as a viable competitor to the NFL.224 As a
result, NFL teams were wary of drafting players in the regular draft
that were under contract to USFL teams, fearing that those picks
would be wasted if the USFL did not go out of business.225
To allay the fears of its member clubs, the NFL sought to establish a
supplemental draft for the players who had signed contracts with
USFL teams. 226 The draft, however, was covered by the CBA with the
NFLPA, which set a maximum allowance of 336 players drafted per
year. Therefore, to hold the supplemental draft, the NFL had to
garner the consent of the union.227
The union was open to the idea of a supplemental draft, but made it
clear that it would have to receive something in return for the
concession. 228 The NFL and the union eventually came to an
agreement allowing a three-round or eighty-four selection draft.2 9 In
return, the NFLPA obtained certain concessions with regard to roster
sizes, pension fund contributions, and the sharing of contract terms. 3 °
Gary Zimmerman, the third player taken in the supplemental draft,
filed suit after playing two seasons in the USFL. 23 ' He alleged that the
supplemental draft violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 32 The
court applied the three-part test established in Mackey, noting it was
the "unique labor and
particularly relevant because the test involved
''233
product markets of professional sports.

224. Id.
225. Id. The importance of the draft picks to the success of NFL franchises is
discussed supra note 188.
226. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 401. The supplemental draft would address the
concerns of NFL teams by allowing them to maintain all of their regular draft picks.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 402.
230. See id. The NFL had a contractual right to reduce the roster size from fortynine to forty-five before the 1984 season. In addition, the union was concerned that
the NFL would not make its $12.5 million contribution to the pension fund because
the fund was over funded and the NFL was concerned that its contribution would not
be tax deductible. Finally, the NFLPA felt that the NFL was in violation of a section
of the CBA which required the member teams to provide copies of player contracts to
the NFLPA. The NFL management committee had objected to providing the
contracts because they had been leaked to the USFL and the press. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 403. It is also worth noting that in this case the NFL conceded that the
Mackey test was the appropriate test under which to evaluate the scope of the nonstatutory exemption. Id.at 403-04. As stated earlier, the three requirements are "(1)
[t]he trade restraint must affect primarily only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship; (2) the agreement must concern a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; and (3) the agreement must be the product of bona fide, arm's-length
bargaining." Id.; see also supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
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The court found that all three prongs of the test were satisfied.234 In
analyzing the first prong the court included potential NFL players in
the bargaining relationship because "'[a]t the time an agreement is
signed between the owners and the players' exclusive bargaining
representative, all players within the bargaining unit and those who
enter the bargaining unit are bound by its terms. "'235 In addition, the
court found it clear, under the facts, that bona fide bargaining took
place.236
237
e. Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n

Joe Caldwell was a player in the American Basketball Association
("ABA"). 238 He was a two-time all-star and served as his team's
player representative to the players' union.239 Caldwell also served as
vice president and president of the union. 24° During the 1974-1975
season, Caldwell had been suspended by his ABA team because they
believed he played a role in another player's intentional absence from
the team.241 Caldwell's contract expired in 1975, and he never player
professional basketball again. 242 After the 1975-1976 season, the ABA
merged with the NBA and Caldwell's team ceased operations.2 43
Caldwell then brought suit alleging that the ABA-and
subsequently the NBA-conspired to keep him out of professional
basketball because of his involvement with the union. 244 The ABA
and the NBA claimed that Caldwell's failure to secure further
employment was due to physical limitations, and not because of
234. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405-06. The court went into an analysis of the
first and third prongs, but did not discuss the second prong because both parties
conceded that the second prong was satisfied. Id. at 404-06.
235. Id. at 405 (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 529
(S.D.N.Y 1984)).
236. Id. at 406.
237. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
238. Id. at 525. The American Basketball Association ("ABA") was an alternative
league to the NBA. It merged with the NBA in 1976 with four teams joining the
NBA: the New Jersey Nets, Denver Nuggets, Indiana Pacers, and San Antonio Spurs.
The other two ABA teams, the St. Louis Spirits and the Kentucky Colonels, were
bought out. Kelley King, Nothing but Net Profits: Two Former ABA Owners are
Getting Superrichfrom a Long-Ago Dream Deal, Sports Illustrated, June 16, 2003, at
24.
239. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 525.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 525-26. The other player, Marvin Barnes, was dissatisfied with his
contract and skipped an important game as a negotiating tactic. Id. After being
suspended, Caldwell filled a federal lawsuit, which was resolved in his favor awarding
him his entire salary for the 1974-1975 season. Id. at 526.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. In addition to the alleged incident involving Marvin Barnes, Caldwell, as
president of the union, had also refused to sign a collective bargaining agreement with
the ABA. Id.
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retribution for his union activities.2 45 The Second Circuit found that
the "circumstances under which an employer may discharge or refuse
to hire an employee" was a mandatory subject of bargaining.246 The
court refused to address the Sherman Act
claim because it was
247
preempted by the non-statutory exemption.
f. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.248
McCourt confronted the version of the Rozelle Rule adopted by the
National Hockey League ("NHL"). 249 The NHL's rule was embodied
in the NHL by-laws, and made applicable to the players through the
Standard Players Contract which was expressly approved by both the
league and the National Hockey League Players Association
("NHLPA").2 5 ° Under the rule, when a free agent player signs a
contract with a new team his original team has the right to
compensation from the signing team. 1 The compensation can be in
the form of an assignment of existing contracts, draft picks, or cash.252
If the two teams cannot agree on appropriate compensation, they each
submit a proposal to an independent arbitrator who then chooses one
of the two proposals.25 3
In 1978, the Detroit Red Wings signed a free agent from the Los
Angeles Kings. 254 The Red Wings and the Kings could not come to an
agreement on compensation so the case went before an arbitrator.25 5
The arbitrator selected the Kings' proposal, which assigned Dale
McCourt's contract to7 the Kings.256 McCourt refused to report to the
25
Kings and filed suit.
The court adopted the Mackey test to decide the applicability of the
non-statutory labor exemption.25 8
The court found that the
compensation rule was part of a valid agreement between the NHL
and the NHLPA that was the result of good faith arm's length
bargaining.259 As such, the rule was protected from the antitrust
laws.26°
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 527.
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1195-96.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Id.
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As shown, multiple lower courts have adopted the Mackey test in

defining the contours of the non-statutory exemption in sports related
cases. 261 However, some lower courts have also used a more
amorphous balancing approach.262 In the Clarett cases, the courts
differed on the appropriate analytical doctrine to evaluate the scope
of the exemption.263

II. THE PROPER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION AND THE ANTITRUST
LIABILITY OF THE NFL

In Clarett, the district court and the Second Circuit came to

different conclusions regarding the legality of the NFL's draft
eligibility rule.2 4 This part presents both courts' opinions. In
addition, this part discusses the main issues that arise regarding the
applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption to Maurice
Clarett's case.265

A. Clarett v. NFL
Maurice Clarett has been excluded from the 2004 NFL draft
because the league has an eligibility rule that restricts access to the
draft to players that are at least three years out of high school. 266 He

asserted that the non-statutory exemption does not shield the NFL's
eligibility rule from the antitrust laws, and that the rule is a violation
of the Sherman Act.267

1. The District Court
The district court held that the non-statutory exemption was

The court
inapplicable to the NFL's draft eligibility rule.268
referenced, but did not expressly adopt, the three-prong test from

261. See supra Parts I.B.3.a-b, I.B.3.d, I.B.3.f; infra Part II.A.1.
262. They use an approach that, without specific guidelines, looks to make the
balance between the national labor policy and the antitrust laws. See supra Part
I.B.3.c; infra Part II.A.2.
263. The district court followed the principles espoused in Mackey, while the circuit
court choose to follow a more general balancing test. See infra Part II.A.
264. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910) (holding that the non-statutory
exemption was applicable, protecting the eligibility rule from the operation of the
antitrust laws); Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 369
F.3d at 124, petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910)
(holding that the non-statutory exemption was inapplicable and that the rule was an
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act).
265. See infra Part II.B.
266. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
267. Clarett,306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
268. Id. at 393.
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The district judge, however, went on to find that the

exemption was inapplicable because the NFL's rule was not a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, Clarett was outside the
bargaining unit, and the rule was not a product of bona fide arm'slength bargaining.27°
After finding the exemption inapplicable, the court analyzed the
antitrust issues.27' Clarett was found to have antitrust standing
because his injury was a direct result of the anticompetitive effects of
the rule. 72 The court then applied the "rule of reason. '"273 The

eligibility rule was held to be unreasonable because it was a "naked
restraint of trade, ' 274 had "no legitimate procompetitive
justification, 2 75 and because there were "less restrictive alternatives"
available to the league. 6

2. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding on the
applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption.

7

As such, the

269. See id. at 391-92.
270. See id. at 393-97. The court found that an eligibility restriction is not a
mandatory subject because it makes a class of potential employees unemployable, and
wages, hours, and working conditions can only apply to those who are employed or
eligible for employment. Id. at 393. The court also considered Clarett to be outside
the bargaining unit because "those who are categorically denied eligibility.., even
temporarily, cannot be bound by the terms of employment they cannot obtain." Id. at
396. Finally, the court found that the rule did not arise from arm's length bargaining
because the rule was not negotiated during the bargaining process. Id. This analysis is
similar to the reasoning employed by the Eighth Circuit in its Mackey test. See supra
Part I.B.3.a.
271. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397-410.
272. Id. at 398-99.
273. Id. at 405. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v.
Board, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), in making its determination to use the rule of reason in the
context of sports leagues. Clarett,306 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
274. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 406. The court found that a policy which excludes
certain competitors from the market altogether is anticompetitive and "precisely the
sort of conduct the antitrust laws were designed to prevent." Id. at 406, 408.
275. Id. at 408. The NFL offered four justifications for the rule: (1) protecting
younger players, who are less mature physically and mentally, from increased risk of
injury; (2) protecting the value of the NFL's television rights and game attendance
revenue from the effects of such injuries; (3) protecting the teams from the costs of
such injuries; and (4) protecting amateur athletes from overtraining, including the use
of steroids, to gain entry to the NFL. Id. The court found that none of the NFL's
justifications were reasonable. Id. The NFL's concern for the health of younger
players, justifications one and four, failed because they did not promote competition.
Id. The second justification failed because the procompetitive effects of the rule
would be in a different market than the anticompetive effects. Id. at 408-09. The third
justification failed because the desire to keep down costs is not a legitimate
procompetitive justification. Id. at 409.
276. Id. at 410. The less restrictive alternative would be to administer individual
testing to assess NFL readiness instead of using age as a proxy for readiness, which
the court found to be a poor substitute. Id.
277. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
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court expressed no opinion on the validity of the antitrust conclusions
of the district judge.278
27 9
The Second Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's Mackey test.
Instead, it framed the issue as "whether subjecting the NFL's
eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental
principles of our federal labor policy.' 28 The court decided that the
eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
because it was either a condition of employment or it was intimately
related to wages and working conditions.2 8 '
After finding that the eligibility restriction was a mandatory subject,
the court decided that it would damage the fundamentals of federal
labor policy to allow antitrust laws to apply.282 According to the court,
Clarett's disagreement with the NFL and the NFLPA's initial criteria
under labor law.283
for employment was a claim rightfully evaluated
21
upheld.
was
rule
eligibility
Thus, the NFL
B. Points of Controversy: The "MandatorySubject" Debate

Following the Clarett decisions, two primary issues exist concerning
the applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption. The first issue
concerns the scope of the exemption, including whether it should be
limited to the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. 85 If the
exemption is limited to mandatory subjects, then the second issue
arises: whether the NFL's eligibility rule qualifies as a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining.286 If the exemption is found
inapplicable, then the NFL rule is susceptible to antitrust law, and the
court must decide whether to apply the rule of reason or per se
illegality to determine if the NFL has violated antitrust law.287 Part
II.B.1 presents the doctrine used to determine the scope of the
exemption, Part II.B.2 examines the classification of the NFL rule as a
mandatory subject of bargaining, and Part II.B.3 discusses the rule of
reason and the per se approach to antitrust liability.

U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
278. Id. at 125 n.1.

279. Id. at 133-34.
280. Id. at 138 (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
281. Id. at 139-40.
282. Id. at 141-42. The court found that federal labor policy encourages NFL teams
to bargain collectively as a multi-employer unit over such matters as the rules of play
and criteria for employment. Id.
283. Id. at 143.
284. See id.
285. See infra Part II.B.1.
286. See infra Part II.B.2.
287. See infra Part II.B.3.
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1. The Scope of the Non-Statutory Exemption
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit examined the Supreme Court nonstatutory exemption case law28 8 and determined that those precedents
provided the appropriate principles to determine the limits of the
exemption. 28 9 In refining the non-statutory exemption doctrine, the
court sought to balance the "proper accommodation of the competing
labor and antitrust interests."2 90
The result of this analysis was the three-prong test discussed
earlier.29 a When a challenged rule meets all three prongs of the test, it
properly accommodates both the national labor policy and federal
antitrust laws.292 Conversely, if a rule fails any of the three prongs,
then it is not protected by the exemption. 93
The Second Circuit expressly rejected the Mackey test in Clarett,
holding that the test did not properly describe the boundaries of the
non-statutory exemption. 294 In addition, the Second Circuit found
that the Supreme Court precedent relied on in Mackey did not apply
to Clarett's situation,295 because the Supreme Court precedent
involved claims of exclusion from competition in the product market
by employers. 96
The court also asserted that the Mackey factors were inconsistent
with Brown, the most recent Supreme Court decision on the
exemption.2 97 The Second Circuit considered the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Brown to be similar to its own analysis in sports industry
non-statutory exemption cases-that
the exemption was necessary to
2 98
protect the goals of the labor policy.
288. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 611-13 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Connell
Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975);
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)).
289. Id. at 613-14.
290. Id. at 614.
291. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
292. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
293. See id.
294. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
295. Id. at 133-34. The court stated as follows:
Moreover, we disagree with the Eighth Circuit's assumption in Mackey that
the Supreme Court's decisions in Connell, Jewel Tea, Pennington,and Allen
Bradley dictate the appropriate boundaries of the non-statutory exemption
for cases in which the only alleged anticompetitive effect of the challenged
restraint is on a labor market organized around a collective bargaining
relationship.
Id.
296. Id. at 134.

297. Id.
298. See id. The court stated as follows:
[T]hat to permit antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that
their concerted action imposed a restraint upon the labor market would
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The Second Circuit took particular issue with the third prong of
Mackey, which requires the agreement to be the result of quid pro quo
This requirement disregards "prior decisions
bargaining. 29 9
recognizing that the labor law policies that warrant withholding
antitrust scrutiny are not limited to protecting only terms contained in
collective bargaining agreements."' 3'0
The Second Circuit held that the NFL rule at issue was a mandatory
subject and therefore avoided the question of whether the exemption
applies beyond mandatory subjects.3 1 The Third Circuit, however,
has suggested that the exemption applies to permissive subjects of
bargaining, although that court did not present any analysis to support
its conclusion.30 2
2. Is the Eligibility Rule a Mandatory Subject?
It is well settled that the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
are wages, hours, and conditions of employment.3 3 The Second
Circuit in Clarett found that the eligibility rule was a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining," because it affected conditions of
employment and/or because it had a tangible effect on wages and
working conditions.
To support the finding that the eligibility rule could be a condition
of employment, the Second Circuit cited only one case, Caldwell v.
American Basketball Ass'n.3 °6 Caldwell held that hiring conditions
were a mandatory subject.30 7 The court believed Caldwell fully
comported with the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, and so
considered Caldwell controlling authority.30 8

seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by these labor laws,
including the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining, the
bargaining parties' freedom of contract, and the widespread use of multiemployer bargaining units. Subsequent to our decisions in this area, similar
reasoning led the Supreme Court in Brown v. Pro Football... to hold that
the non-statutory exemption protected the NFL's unilateral implementation
of new salary caps for developmental squad players after its collective
bargaining agreement with the NFL players union had expired and
negotiations with the union over that proposal reached an impasse. We
need only retrace the path laid down by these prior cases to reach the
conclusion that Clarett's antitrust claims must fail.
Id. at 135 (citations omitted).
299. Id. at 143.
300. Id. at 142.
301. Id. at 139 n.17.
302. Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983).
303. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981).
304. Clarett,369 F.3d at 139 n.17.
305. Id. at 139-40.
306. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995); see also supra Part I.B.3.e.
307. Clarett,369 F.3d at 139-40.
308. Id. at 138.
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The Second Circuit also found the tangible effects on wages and
working conditions to include the possibility that the elimination of
the eligibility rule could alter underlying assumptions upon which the
agreement was made.30 9 In addition, due to NFL roster limits, the
reduction in competition afforded by the rule affects the job security
of veteran players.3 t0
The district court in Clarett, however, had a different view. 31' The
district judge held that "the [r]ule makes a class of potential players
unemployable. Wages, hours, or working conditions affect only those
who are employed or eligible for employment."3"' Thus, the district
court found that eligibility restrictions were not conditions of
employment and so could not be classified as mandatory subjects of
bargaining.313 The court found that Caldwell concerned conditions
under which one may be fired and, thus, was not applicable to a case
involving job eligibility restrictions. 314
The district court also
determined that the rule was not intimately related to wages, as the
only way in which the' rule
affects wages is "that a player subject to the
315
[r]ule will earn none.
In addition to the Clarett opinions, there is statistical evidence that
is relevant to the effect the rule will have on wages and working
conditions, specifically job security of veteran players. Since the 1990
NFL draft (the first to allow players less than four years removed
from high school to be eligible) an average of thirty-five underclass
players per year have entered the draft.316

In the first year of the

increased eligibility, 1990, thirty-five underclass players entered the
draft.3 17 Before the Second Circuit reinstated the NFL's eligibility rule

(restricting draft access to players three years removed from high
school), only nine players who would not have been eligible under
that eligibility rule declared for the draft.3"8 Of these nine only two,
309. Id. at 140.
310. Id.
311. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 369
F.3d at 124, petitionfor cert.filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
312. Id. at 393.
313. See id.
314. Id. at 395.
315. Id.
316. See NFL Players Ass'n, 2003 Underclass Players Entering the Draft, What
Happened to the 2001 & 2002 Players and 1990-2002 Averages, available at
http://nflpa.org/PDFs/Shared/2003-UnderclassPlayers-EnteringThe-Draft-(Revise
dJune_2003).pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005) (providing data from the 1990 through
2003 drafts); Sportsillustrated.com, Underclassmen Entering the 2004 NFL Draft, at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/football/ncaa/underclassmen.draft
(last visited
Feb. 13, 2005) (listing the underclassmen entering the 2004 NFL draft). The data
provides that 523 collegians have entered the NFL draft over fifteen seasons, equaling
an average of 34.87 underclassmen per season.
317. See NFL Players Ass'n, supra note 316.
318. See Early Draft Hopefuls Are No More than Obscure, Wash. Post, Mar. 6,
2004, at D2 [hereinafter Early Hopefuls].
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Clarett and Mike Williams of the University of Southern California,319
were serious about entering the NFL. 321 In addition, from 1990-2003,

an average of fewer than five underclassmen per year have gone undrafted and then signed a free agent contract.321

If the resolution of the scope of the exemption and the classification
of the NFL rule as a mandatory subject does not support the
application of the non-statutory exemption, then a court must
determine the proper approach to antitrust liability.
3. The Rule of Reason v. Per Se Illegality

The Supreme Court has found group boycotts to be per se
violations of the Sherman Act, and thus any inquiry into their

reasonableness or benefits would be wholly irrelevant.322 Of course
the per se rule only applies after the two threshold requirements are
met and the Sherman Act is invoked.3 3
There have been instances where the Supreme Court indulged the
rule of reason analysis in the context of group boycotts.324 The per se
319. Williams is an All-American receiver who was widely considered to be a first
round draft pick before the Second Circuit reinstated the NFL's eligibility rule. See
Mark Maske, Executives Eye USC's Williams: Front-Office Personnel May Rethink
Draft Order if Wideout Declares, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 2004, at E3.
320. Apparently, the other seven declared their eligibility as no more than a
novelty. See Early Hopefuls, supra note 318. Of the other seven to declare themselves
eligible for the draft five were still in high school. Of that group, one was from a
school for the developmentally disabled, one was from a school that did not even have
a football team, another never played varsity high school football, and the last two
were not on their school's varsity rosters during the 2003-2004 school year. Id. The
only other college player to declare for the draft was a defensive back from Pasadena
City College, where he had zero interceptions for a team that went 0-10. Id.
Additionally, there is no evidence that when the NFL first allowed juniors into the
draft, those newly eligible players that declared for the draft were anything other than
serious about playing in the NFL. It seems much less likely that juniors in college
would declare for the draft as a joke than it is that high school kids would. NCAA
eligibility rules allow players to declare for the draft once during their collegiate
career and still potentially regain their collegiate eligibility; thus, it would be strange
for a college junior (especially a "redshirted" player who still has two years of
collegiate eligibility remaining) to waste this opportunity on a joke. See infra notes
469-71 and accompanying text. Also, because the 1990 rule change was implemented
by the league and not by a court's decision, there was no legal uncertainty
surrounding it.
321. See NFL Players Ass'n, supra note 316 (sixty-five underclassmen over
fourteen drafts have signed as rookie free agents).
322. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941)
(holding that there was no judicial error by the lower courts in refusing to hear
evidence as to the reasonableness of a boycott by certain garment and textile
manufacturers of others who copied their designs). The Court found that this
information would be wholly irrelevant and that even if design copying was tortious
under the laws of all states it would still not justify a group boycott. Id. at 468.
323. See supra Part I.A.2.
324. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1963) (recognizing that a
"justification derived from the policy of another statute or otherwise" could overcome
the illegal per se approach to group boycotts).
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rule has traditionally been applied to player restraint cases in the
sports context. 325 This, however, has not been universal and recently
courts have been more willing to apply the rule of reason approach. 26
1II. AN UNREASONABLE RULE ABOUT A PERMISSIVE SUBJECT OF
BARGAINING AND A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW REQUIREMENT TO THE
NON-STATUTORY EXEMPTION DOCTRINE
A court wrongfully applying an exemption to the antitrust laws has
excluded Maurice Clarett from the NFL. This part demonstrates that
the Second Circuit erred, under its own analysis, in holding that the
non-statutory labor exemption shielded the NFL from antitrust
liability.327 Additionally, under the antitrust laws the NFL eligibility
rule should be declared illegal, as an unreasonable restraint on
trade.328 Finally, this part proposes a new requirement to be added to
the non-statutory exemption doctrine that would stop the exemption
rule in this case even if the Second Circuit
from protecting the NFL's
32 9
had correctly analyzed it.

A. The Non-Statutory Exemption Should Not Apply: The NFL
Eligibility Rule Is Not a Mandatory Subject
The Supreme Court has never defined, with precision, the nonstatutory labor exemption."' The Court, however, has repeatedly
referenced only the mandatory subjects in justifying the application of
As such, agreements that do not implicate the
the exemption.3
325. See Michael Tannenbaum, A Comprehensive Analysis of Recent Antitrust and
Labor Litigation Affecting the NBA and NFL, 3 Sports Law. J. 205, 209 (1996); see
also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-66 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (holding that the NBA's player restraint rule, that a player must be four years
removed from his high school graduating class, did not fall into the one narrow
exception to the per se rule, and was thus a group boycott illegal on its face).
326. Tannenbaum, supra note 325, at 209; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
University of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). For the summary of this case, see supra Part
I.A.4.b.
327. See infra Part III.A.
328. See infra Part III.B.
329. See infra Part III.C.
330. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
331. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 689 (1965). The Court stated that:
[The Supreme Court] pointed out in Pennington that the exemption for
union-employer agreements is very much a matter of accommodating the
coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws. Employers and
unions are required to bargain about wages, hours and working conditions,
and this fact weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements
on these subjects.
Id.; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1996) (stating that "to
subject the [challenged agreement] to antitrust law is to require antitrust courts to
answer a host of important practical questions about how collective bargaining over
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mandatory subjects should not be afforded the protection of the
exemption.3 32
The mandatory subjects of bargaining are wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.33 3 The purpose of classifying
something as a mandatory subject "is to 'promote the fundamental
purpose of the [NLRA] by bringing a problem of vital concern to
established by Congress
labor and management within the framework
334
as most conducive to industrial peace.'
In Clarett, the Second Circuit decided that the NFL's eligibility rule
was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 335 The court found
that the rule possibly fell under this protection as a condition for
initial employment, but was definitely protected because it "[has]
tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL
players. ' 336 However, as demonstrated below, neither of these
assertions justifies the use of the non-statutory exemption to protect
the NFL's eligibility.
1. The Eligibility Rule Is Not a Condition of Employment
Conditions of employment are limited to those conditions under
which one has to perform his job. 337 To include eligibility restrictions
as a condition of employment would be inconsistent with the NLRA
because it extends the coverage of "conditions of employment"
beyond just employees, its elimination does nothing to harm collective
wages, hours, and working conditions is to proceed-the very result that the implicit
labor exemption seeks to avoid"); H. A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n,
451 U.S. 704, 716 n.19 (1981) (stating that where "union agreements with nonlabor
groups... may have the effect of sheltering the nonlabor groups from competition in
product markets, the Court has recognized a 'nonstatutory' exemption to shield such
agreements if they are intimately related to the union's vital concerns of wages, hours,
and working conditions"); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (stating that "[t]he nonstatutory exemption
has its source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to
eliminate competition over wages and working conditions"); United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965) (stating that "there is nothing in the
labor policy indicating that the union and the employers in one bargaining unit are
free to bargain about the wages, hours and working conditions of other bargaining
units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire industry").
332. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1979)
(adopting the test laid down in Mackey); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir.
1976) (requiring that the agreement be over a mandatory subject to invoke the
exemption). But see Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d
Cir. 1983) (stating that the exemption applies when agreements are about mandatory
or permissive subjects).
333. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672,702 (1980).
334. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 678 (1981) (quoting
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,211 (1964)).
335. Clarett,369 F.3d at 139-40.
336. Id. at 140.
337. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 369
F.3d at 124, petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).

2416

[Vol. 73

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

bargaining, and by its very nature can only apply to ineligible
potential employees.338 In addition, the Second Circuit's support for
its holding is limited and distinguishable.339
a. The National Labor Relations Act "Speaks"
The NLRA contemplates its own applicability to be limited to
employees.34 ° It does, however, consider the term "employee" to be
broader than just describing the employees of a particular employer.34'
As the Second Circuit noted in Wood v. NBA, this is necessary to
facilitate collective bargaining. 34 As such, potential employees in
some situations must be included in the bargaining unit to protect
bargaining.343 Neither this necessity nor the NLRA, however, suggests
that those in Clarett's position be included in the bargaining unit.3 "
The NLRA defines an employee as
includ[ing] any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer.., and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment..

345

..

This definition suggests that the Act views employees as broadly
including more than just those working for a specific employer at a
specific point
in time, but not so broad as to cover all potential
346
employees.
The definition describes "any employee," but does not reference
those who are not employees at all." 7 The definition goes on to use
the term "any individual," which applies to people "whose work has
'
ceased."348
This, at least implicitly, requires that the person must have
338. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151,152(3) (2000).
339. See infra notes 360-69 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 145. The introductory section to the NLRA repeatedly
references the need to protect employees and workers. In addition, it speaks of
restoring equal bargaining power between employees and employers. See supra note
145.
341. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (the court looked to the
definition of "employee" under the NLRA to extend the coverage of the exemption
beyond just current employees).
342. Id. If collective bargaining agreements only applied to current employees and
employers had to separately deal with each new employee, there would be no reason
for them to bargain collectively in the first place.
343. See id.

344. See infra notes 345-59 and accompanying text.
345. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
346. See infra notes 349-59 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 345 and accompanying text. Although this mandates that an
employee is not limited to a particular employer, it still describes the person as an
employee.
348. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
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already been an employee. Clarett is no one's employee, he is an
amateur athlete.
To effectuate the congressional intent for collective bargaining, the
NLRA must cover some potential employees to foster incentives for
employers to bargain collectively.3 49 The NLRA definition, however,
imposes limits on who should be considered an employee.3 5 Including
all future potential employees within this definition would leave the
definition of "employees" virtually limitless. If Congress intended
such broad coverage it would have used the term "person" instead of
"employee" when it wrote the statute.
This extension should be limited to eligible employees only, and not
be so broad as to cover all potential future employees.35 1 This
inference makes sense in light of the desire to protect the collective
bargaining process.35 2 Limiting the extension to future and eligible
employees would do nothing to dissuade employers from bargaining.
Eligibility restrictions would be challengeable, but it would not open
the door for potential employees to challenge all of the results of
collective bargaining. 3 Hours, wages, and working conditions would
still be left up to labor policy and employers would still have all the
same incentives to bargain over these subjects.3 54 This is precisely the
outcome that the NLRA seeks to foster.355
There is more evidence in the NLRA that suggests that an eligibility
requirement should not be considered a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. The NLRA looks to foster collective bargaining
between employers and labor organizations over the mandatory
subjects of bargaining."6 As such, the NLRA's definition of "labor
organization" shines some light on what should be considered
mandatory subjects.
The definition of "labor organization" extends to include labor
groups that deal with disputes over "grievances, labor disputes, wages,

349. See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text. By extending the definition of
employee beyond just those working for a particular employer, the Act does suggest
that some nonemployees must be covered by its terms. See supra note 345 and
accompanying text.
350. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 270; see also Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
352. See supra Part I.B.1. A labor-employer agreement must be applicable to
future employees or the incentives to bargain would be destroyed. See supra notes
341-43 and accompanying text.
353. Future but ineligible employees would likely lack standing to challenge
anything but the eligibility restrictions. Once the employees became eligible they
would then be considered part of the bargaining unit and the union-employer
agreements would cover them.
354. See sUpra note 353.

355. See supra Part I.B.1.
356. See supra note 145.
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rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.

Conspicuously

missing

from

this

list

are

requirements

357

for

employment. "Conditions of work" is preceded by the phrase "hours

of employment," which suggests that "employment" and "work" are
not synonymous. The term employment is broader than work.
Accordingly, conditions of work must be limited to the conditions
under which one must perform their job, and cannot describe the
conditions one must meet to gain employment. Additionally, the
statute does not use the terms "eligibility requirements" or
"conditions for employment."
Furthermore, the NLRA definition of "'labor dispute' includes any

terms, tenure or conditions of
concerning
controversy
employment .... , 35 8 The use of "tenure" independent of conditions
of employment shows the Act does not intend "conditions of

employment" to include issues about how one may be terminated or
required to cease working (for example mandatory retirement). If
conditions of employment is not meant to cover the reasons one may
be fired, it should not cover the conditions under which one can be
hired. The fact that Congress did not specifically mention conditions
for employment, as it did with "tenure," shows that the NLRA did not
intend conditions of employment to cover eligibility restrictions.35 9
b. The Reasoning of the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit, however, states that the eligibility rule may
qualify as a condition of work.3" This statement is backed up with
limited evidence and virtually no principled analysis.' The lone case
cited by the Second Circuit was Caldwell v. American Basketball
Ass'n, 3 in which "the circumstances under which an employer may
discharge or refuse to hire an employee" were considered a
mandatory subject of bargaining.363 In light of the NLRA principles
presented above, the Second Circuit erred in Caldwell.3 "

357. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2000); see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
358. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9).
359. Of course it is possible that the omission of any reference to conditions for
employment shows that Congress intended "conditions of employment" to cover
them. This, however, seems unlikely because, if Congress intended the term to cover
the conditions under which one can be hired, it is logical that it would also cover the
conditions under which one may be fired. This would make the use of the term
"tenure" redundant and unnecessary.
360. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
361. See id
362. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995). For a summary of this case, see supra Part I.B.3.e.
363. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529.
364. The inclusion of rules regarding eligibility for employment as a mandatory
subject is inconsistent with the NLRA. The definitions of both "labor organization"
and "labor dispute" show that the Act did not contemplate conditions of work or
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Additionally, even if Caldwell was consistent with the NLRA, it is
factually dissimilar to Clarett, and the impetus behind the court's
decision in Caldwell does not exist in Clarett.365
In Caldwell the claimant had already been employed as a
professional athlete, unlike Maurice Clarett, who is being denied that
opportunity. Caldwell was also refused further employment based
upon his individual actions or abilities, and not banned from the
marketplace by an across the board rule like in Clarett. The Caldwell
court, in providing antitrust immunity, was concerned with the
potential for "[e]very employee who is locked out by a multiemployer
group, every striker who is not reinstated, and every employee who is
discharged [to] bring an antitrust action ... ."I' These concerns do
not apply to Clarett. He is not a striker that failed to get reinstated or
a discharged employee. Allowing initial eligibility restrictions to be
challenged on antitrust grounds would in no way permit strikers or
discharged employees to bring suit, as both of these groups must have
already been employed.
In addition, it is unfair to characterize Clarett as a locked-out
employee, but even if he is, the circumstances are still distinguishable
from Caldwell. The court in Caldwell was faced with an employee
who had been "locked out" based upon his actions.3 67 Accordingly,
interpreting mandatory subjects not to include an across-the-board
eligibility restriction would have no effect on plaintiffs like
Caldwell. 3"
As such, the Second Circuit erred in Caldwell by broadly stating
that the conditions under which one may be hired are conditions of
employment. Additionally, even if Caldwell was properly decided, the
Second Circuit still erred by extending its ruling in Caldwell to cover
Maurice Clarett because his situation is sufficiently distinct as not to
invoke the fears that drove the Caldwell court.369

conditions of employment to encompass eligibility restrictions. See supra notes 356-60
and accompanying text.
365. See supra Part I.B.3.e.
366. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 530.
367. There was no across the board rule restricting access. Rather, Caldwell was
being refused employment based on his individual actions. Whether those actions
were based upon his physical limitations, as the district court held, or his union
activities, which the circuit court focused on, is wholly irrelevant. Either way, he had
been given individual consideration. See id. at 526, 530.
368. The Caldwell court's concern with every employee who is locked out being
able to bring an antitrust challenge would not be implicated. If initial eligibility
restrictions, like the NFL rule, were declared permissive subjects, not every employee
who has been locked out would be allowed to sue, just those denied the opportunity
for employment by an across the board rule. This result would not create floods of
antitrust litigation; it would not even have covered Caldwell.
369. See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text.
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2. The Eligibility Rule Is Not Intimately Related to Wages or
Working Conditions
The Second Circuit, however, also determined that the NFL's rule
is a mandatory subject because it is intimately related to wages and
working conditions.3 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted issues
intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions as
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.3 71 The Court has
described this relationship as "whether [the subject] vitally affect[s]
the 'terms and condition' of [a worker's] employment. 3 72 Even under
a broad reading it is difficult to assert that the eligibility rule vitally
affects wages or working conditions.37 3
The Second Circuit in Clarett found that the eligibility requirement
had tangible effects on wages and working conditions.374 In support of
this, the court merely stated that the "[eligibility rule's] elimination
might well alter certain assumptions underlying the collective
bargaining agreement between the NFL and its players union 3 75 and
"[b]ecause the size of NFL teams is capped, the eligibility rules
diminish a veteran player's risk of being replaced by either a drafted
rookie or a player who enters the draft and, though not drafted, is
'
then hired as a rookie free agent."376
An examination of these two
assertions shows that neither supports classification as a mandatory
subject, and thus cannot support the application of the non-statutory
exemption to Clarett's case.377
a. Underlying Assumptions Cannot Qualify as Mandatory Subjects
The Second Circuit's assertion in Clarett that the eligibility rule is
intimately related to a mandatory subject does not mesh with the
Supreme Court's requirement that this relation must "vitally affect[]"
a mandatory subject.3 78 Underlying assumptions may have some
370. See supra Part II.A.2.
371. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 689 (1965).
372. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971); see also NLRB v. USPS, 18 F.3d 1089, 1100 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that a matter must "vitally affect" terms and conditions of employment
to be considered a mandatory subject); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30,
33 (9th Cir. 1971) ("A mere remote, indirect or incidental impact is not sufficient. In
order for a matter to be subject to mandatory collective bargaining it must materially
or significantly affect the terms or conditions of employment.").
373. See infra notes 375-93 and accompanying text.
374. See supra Part II.A.2.
375. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
376. Id.
377. See infra Parts III.A.2.a-b.
378. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971).
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tangential effect on wages and working conditions, but not enough to

rise to the level of "vitally affecting."37' 9 The potential is great for

underlying assumptions to alter the basis upon which a CBA is made.
Deciding what actually was an underlying assumption, and to what
extent it affected a mandatory subject, is an extremely speculative
inquiry that cannot dictate when the exemption will operate to
effectuate the national labor policy.
Classifying underlying assumptions as mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining would destroy any limit to the exemption that is
created by the Supreme Court's focus on mandatory subjects.380 It
would create an extremely broad doctrine, which would be
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's description of the doctrine as
"a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions."38'
In addition, the Clarett court did not distinguish underlying
assumptions that would qualify as mandatory subjects from those that
would not; it simply defined agreements that may alter underlying
assumptions as mandatory subjects.38 2 If this is the case there would
be no point in defining and limiting mandatory subjects to begin with.
b. The Effect, or Lack Thereof,on Veteran PlayerJob Security

In addition to finding that the eligibility rule could have altered
underlying assumptions to the NFL CBA, the Second Circuit also
found that the rule was a mandatory subject because it affected the
job security of veteran players.3 83 However, there is no indication that
without the rule a large number of athletes will start leaving college
before their junior year or skip college altogether." Since the NFL's
eligbility rule was first changed in 1990-allowing players three years
removed from their high school graduations to enter the draft-an
average of just under thirty-five newly eligible players per year have
entered the draft, which is the same amount of players that entered
379. See supra notes 371-72 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 331.
381. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975). It is likely that an underlying assumption to the NFL CBA is that
there is not now, nor will there be, a professional football league that presents a
legitimate competitor to the NFL. This assumption would not, however, immunize
from antitrust liability concerted action taken by the league and its player association
to remove the competitor. See id. at 622-23 (stating that "the nonstatutory exemption
offers no... protection when a union and a nonlabor party agree to restrain
competition in a business market"). It might be argued that the eligibility rule was a
more direct assumption of the CBA than an assumption about alternative competitive
leagues, and thus was a more closely linked assumption to the NFL CBA. If this was
true, however, the NFL eligibility rule would have been explicitly stated in the CBA,
which it was not.
382. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
383. See id.
384. See infra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
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the draft in the first year of the increased eligibility.38 5 These numbers

show that the number of juniors declaring themselves eligible has
remained relatively unchanged since they were first allowed to do so.
If the trend that exists among college juniors foregoing their final
year of collegiate eligibility holds true for other underclassmen, the
number that leave early in subsequent years will not grow
exponentially from the initial year of the increased eligibility, which
saw just two players enter the draft.386 Even if five players in a year

were to declare themselves eligible, more than double the two that
have declared in the initial year, it would represent less than 0.3% of
NFL players.387

This certainly reflects an interest of the player's

association to preserve some current jobs. However, this interest is
not significant enough to rise to the level of "vitally affects," which is
required for classification as a mandatory subject.38 8
The assumption that newly eligible players will replace veteran

players 389 also does not mesh with the reality of professional football.
Rookies have a significant learning curve, and often need time to
adjust to the NFL game. 390 As such, they often are not capable of
This learning curve would only be
contributing right away."'
exacerbated by younger players with fewer years of college football

experience entering the NFL. 3' The pressure to win in professional

sports is substantial, and it would be inconsistent to expect teams to
replace veteran players capable of contributing at advanced levels

with rookies who are not. It is more likely that rookies less than three
385. See supra note 316-17 and accompanying text.
386. Due to the legal proceedings that surrounded this year's draft, it can be argued
that the number of players less than three years removed from their high school
graduations that declared eligible for the draft was artificially depressed.
387. There are thirty-two teams in the NFL that each have a fifty-three player
roster limit. This equals a total of 1696 players in the NFL. Even if the number of
players that would have declared without the legal uncertainty was ten players it
would only represent approximately 0.6% of NFL jobs; if it was twenty players it
would be 0.12% of jobs, and if it was sixty players it would be 0.35% of jobs.
However, these increases would seem unlikely given the fact that the media coverage
of college players that would declare for the draft if the rule was declared illegal
If more collegiate
focused almost entirely on Clarett and Mike Williams.
undergraduates were contemplating entering the draft in the wake of the district
court's decision, it is certainly reasonable to assume that the national sports media
would have written about them, in addition to writing about Clarett and Williams.
388. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text.
389. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910) (finding that the rule is covered as a
mandatory subject because it affects the job security of veteran players).
390. Brian Allee-Walsh, Earlier Entries Are Now Cause for Concern: NFL
Officials Worry After Clarett Decision, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 22,
2004, at C1.
391. See id.
392. This is a possible reason why the NFL has the eligibility rule. It places college
football in the position of providing the NFL with a cheap and efficient system for
developing players to the point where they can contribute on a NFL team. See Koch,
supra note 58, at 321.
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years removed from high school will take the spot of other first year
players or be placed on the practice squad, neither of which would
implicate current union member jobs. Thus, the eligibility rule will
have little more than a de minimis effect on the wages and working
conditions of veteran players.393

Removing eligibility restrictions from the protection of the
exemption would not automatically declare them illegal. Courts are
more frequently applying the rule of reason, especially in the sports
context. 394 As noted above, NCAA v. Board may mandate the use of

the rule of reason in the professional football context.395 Therefore, it
would just change the lens through which courts analyze these rules.
B. The NFL Rule Is an UnreasonableRestrainton Trade
If the exemption is found inapplicable then the NFL's eligibility

rule becomes vulnerable to an antitrust attack. The NFL, while
maintaining that the exemption applies, also asserted that Clarett does
not have antitrust standing.3 96 Clarett has suffered an antitrust injury
and has antitrust standing.3 97 His injury, the lost opportunity to play
professional football and make a substantial income while doing so,
flows directly from the conduct alleged to be in violation of the
challenged the eligibility rule, which is the
Sherman Act. Clarett 398
direct cause of his injury.

393. A potential criticism of defining conditions of work as not including conditions
under which one may be hired is that it is inconsistent with employer-labor
agreements. For example, a rule that makes people with serious medical conditions
or communicable diseases ineligible would surely be legal. The reason, however,
would not be because the labor exemption shielded it from antitrust law, but rather
because the restriction was legal under antitrust law because its purpose and effect
was not anticompetitive but rather promoted player safety. See Neeld v. NHL, 594
F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that an NHL rule banning players with sight
in only one eye was legal; analyzing the rule under antitrust principles, rejecting a per
se approach, and finding that the rule was reasonable as promoting safety). The NFL
claims that its rule is also based on promoting safety. See supra note 275. Its effect,
however, is much broader than in the examples given above. The examples do
regulate competition. However, because the regulation would be based on the
condition that causes the threat, it would not threaten to exclude numerous viable
candidates (those physically and mentally prepared to play in the NFL). As such, it
could actually have the incidental effect of promoting competition. The NFL rule
denies viable candidates the opportunity to join the league, thus suppressing
competition.
394. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984)
(applying the rule of reason to a restrictive NCAA television contract because
horizontal restraints are necessary to make the product available at all in the college
sports industry); see also Tannenbaum, supra note 325, at 209.
395. See supra Part II.B.3.
396. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73
U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04-910).
397. See supra Part I.A.

398. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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After establishing standing, Clarett's case is similar to Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.39 9 The eligibility rule at issue in
Denver Rockets was found to constitute a group boycott. 400 After
finding that the action met the two threshold requirements for the
application of antitrust law,4 °1 the court in Denver Rockets went on to
apply the per se rule of illegality for group boycotts. 4
Since the district court decided Denver Rockets, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly found the applicability of the per se approach to be
inappropriate to group boycott cases. 3 In NCAA v. Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma, the court refused to apply the per se

approach to college football because it is an industry where some

restraints are necessary if the product is going to be available. 4"
The NFL eligibility rule should suffer the same fate as its

counterpart in the NBA, although for a different reason. Professional
football is an industry that requires some restraints if the product is
going to be available, thus requiring the use of the rule of reason. 40
Practices such as the draft itself,406 the salary cap, and television black
out restrictions4
available.

7

are all restraints necessary to allow the product to be

The NFL's eligibility rule, however, is designed to keep an entire
class of potential employees out of the league.

It does not simply

regulate to promote competition, but rather it suppresses competition.
Perhaps

if the

NFL

restricted

access

based

upon individual

consideration of an applicant's health, it may just regulate and thereby

399. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
400. Id. at 1066.
401. The statutory language of the Sherman Act sets up two threshold
requirements: "(1) [t]here must be some effect on 'trade or commerce among the
several States,' and (2) there must be sufficient agreement to constitute a 'contract,
combination ... or conspiracy."' Id. at 1062 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (omissions
in original)); see also Telsat v. Entm't and Sports Programming Network, 753 F. Supp.
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
402. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
403. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 452 (1990).
404. See supra Part I.A.4.b.
405. See Tannenbaum, supra note 325, at 209; see also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d
606, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding the rule of reason preferable to the per se
approach for the unique situation of the NFL because the member teams each have a
stake in the continued existence and success of the other teams). The court found this
important in light of the fact that the line of cases that deployed the per se approach
"generally concerned agreements between business partners in the traditional sense."
Id. at 619.
406. This differs from the eligibility restrictions for the draft which are at issue in
Clarett.
407. The NFL television contracts call for blackouts of games in the home team's
local market if that game is not sold out by a particular time during the week before
the game is to be played. See Two Minute Drill: Blackout Rule Eased, Wash. Post,
Sept. 24, 2001, at D9.
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promote competition.4"8 This, however, is not what the NFL has
an
chosen to do. The NFL's eligibility restriction should be found
40 9
unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
C. The Non-Statutory Labor Exemption Should Require that the
Agreement Come from Adverse Interests

Even if the NFL's eligibility rule is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, or if the exemption applies to issues beyond the
mandatory subjects, the exemption should still be declared
inapplicable to the eligibility rule. The Court has indicated that
classification as a mandatory subject is not always sufficient to invoke
the protection of the exemption. 410

However, the Court has never

articulated what besides classification as a mandatory subject is
necessary to invoke the exemption. An examination of Supreme
Court precedent and national labor policy reveals a common theme
that the courts should adopt to govern the application of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
This Comment proposes that the
exemption

should only be applicable

to agreements

that the

bargaining parties have adverse interests over.
1. The National Labor Policy Through the Lens of the National

Labor Relations Act
The NLRA contemplates a relationship between employers and
labor groups that is adversarial. 411 The use of the terms "grievances"

and "labor disputes" in defining a "labor organization," as well as
''controversy" in defining a "labor dispute," shows that Congress
envisioned a situation where collective bargaining would be needed 412
to
resolve issues over which labor and employers had adverse interests.
The Act sets out the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining as
being "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of

408. In that instance applicants would focus on developing themselves (both
mentally and physically) to the point where they would be viable NFL candidates.
This focus on one's mental and physical viability could increase the number of
realistic applicants to the NFL and promote competition.
409. The Sherman Act requires an agreement between parties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(2000). It has generally been held that sports leagues meet this requirement. See, e.g.,
L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984). One
commentator, however, has argued that the relationship between the NFL and its
member clubs should be viewed no differently than that of a parent company and one
of its subsidiaries. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 140-48.
410. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965)
("This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is
automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations
involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the form and
content of the agreement.").
411. See supra Part I.B.1.
412. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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employment. '413 It is these topics over which employers and labor are
at the core of what
likely to differ most vehemently, and so they are
414
the NLRA and our labor policy seeks to protect.
A potential argument is that it is not necessary that everything
bargained for be adversarial in nature, so long as the overall
bargaining reflects opposing sides of the table. This, however,
misconceives the inquiry. Contesting what may be a part of a CBA is
not the issue presented here. What is presented is the assertion that
inclusion in a CBA does not automatically make the challenged
agreement exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws. 4 5 The
national labor policy, as viewed through the NLRA, is based upon this
underlying concept of conflict between the parties bargaining.416 To
be consistent with this view, the exemption must be limited to only
those situations where the challenged rule, regulation, or agreement
reflects the adversarial positions of the parties.4 17
2. The National Labor Policy Through the Eyes of the Supreme
Court
In addition to the NLRA, Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly
pointed to the adversarial relationship, using terms such as "disputes,"
"controversies," "conflicts," and "combatants" in defining the purpose
of the national labor policy. 418 All of these terms describe situations
where the parties are in disagreement. This shows that the national
labor policy was effectuated in order to allow meaningful bargaining
to take place over issues on which the interests of the parties are
opposed.419
3. The Proposed Adversarial Requirement and Prior Case Law
Although the adversarial requirement is not expressly stated in the
non-statutory exemption case law, it is nonetheless consistent with
that history. The adversarial requirement underlies the reasoning
behind decisions and is also consistent with the facts of the cases.
Each of the following cases was presented in Part 1,42° but they will
now be revisited to demonstrate that the case law supports the
adversarial requirement.

413. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000); see also Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 685 (1965); Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65.
414. See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
415. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661-63. For a summary of this case, see supra Part
I.B.2.b.
416. See supra Part I.B.1.
417. See supra Part I.B.1.
418. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
420. See supra Part I.B.
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a. Supreme Court Cases
i. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.4"'
It is evident from the facts of this case that the interests of the
butcher's union and Jewel Tea were adverse. The grocery store
wanted the butchers to work at night so that they could sell meat after
6 p.m.422 The union wanted to limit the butchers' hours to daytime
hours.4 23 This opposition can be traced back to 1919 when butchers
went on strike to restrict working hours.42 4 The adversity is clear when
you take into account that the union threatened to strike in order to
obtain the restrictions, and Jewel Tea only signed the agreement
under duress and then sued.42 5
426
ii. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington

The turning point of Pennington was that the agreement was meant
to settle the wage scale for the whole industry.4 27 It is precisely this
requirement that stopped the interests of the bargaining parties from
being adverse. Normally when dealing with wage increases the
interests of a union and an employer are adverse; unions usually want
to increase wages and employers do not. When, however, the
agreement also mandates that the wage increase be demanded across
the board, the employer's interest changes. Here, the increased wage
is intended to drive the smaller companies out of business, which
reduces competition and benefits the large operators.428 As such the
agreement would benefit both sides involved in the bargaining and
align their interests with one another.
iii. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100429

The Supreme Court refused to apply the non-statutory exemption
to the agreement between Connell and the union.43" The Court found
that "[1labor policy clearly does not require.., that a union have
freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who

421. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
422.
423.
424.
425.

See supra Part I.B.2.a.
See supra Part I.B.2.a.
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697.
See supra Part I.B.2.a.

426. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
427. Id. at 665-66.
428. See supra Part I.B.2.b.

429. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
430. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
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employ its members. ' 43 1 The Court further stated that "the
nonstatutory exemption offers no similar protection [compared with
the protection that the statutory exemption provides to unilateral
union activity that restrains competition] when a union and 43a2
nonlabor party agree to restrain competition in a business market.
This is precisely what the NFL and its player's union are doing in
Clarett. Clarett, like Connell, is being excluded from the business
market because of an agreement between a union and employer that
restrains competition.
Although the result in Connell appears inconsistent with the
adversarial requirement, it is not. The interests in Connell are
adverse, as indicated by the strike and subsequent lawsuit. 433 The
union benefits by ensuring that more jobs get awarded to
subcontractors that hire union labor. Connell on the other hand
would be restricting the subcontractors he can deal with, potentially
raising the cost of his jobs. The adversarial requirement is not meant
to, nor could it, define the precise boundaries of the non-statutory
exemption. Rather, the requirement is meant to limit the exemption
to ensure that it does no more than effectuate the national labor
policy. 4 4 There are additional requirements, like that in Connell,
which may limit the application of the exemption in cases where
interests are adverse. These additional requirements are wholly
consistent with the adversarial approach. Inconsistency would be
generated by precedent that applied the exemption to a situation
where the interests were not adverse.
4 35
iv. Brown v. Pro Football,Inc.

In Brown, the Court applied the exemption past the point of
impasse to protect the NFL's implementation of a development squad
with a uniform wage.436 The creation of the squad would add jobs,

thus benefiting the union. However, the issue in this case was not the
creation of the practice squad, but rather the wages that squad players
would receive. 437 An artificial cap on salary is not in the interest of the
union, as it deflates salaries for squad players. Potential squad players
can not shop their services around the league, thereby allowing
competitive bidding to determine their salary. These provisions
would be adverse to the membership of the union. This proved true
as the union vehemently opposed these provisions to the point of

431. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.

432. Id. at 622-23.
433. See supra Part I.B.2.c.
434. See supra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.

435. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
436. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
437. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
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impasse after which the league implemented them unilaterally.4 38 The
league, however, was benefited by the limited wages by reducing the
cost of operating the practice squad, as evidenced by its refusal to
concede at the bargaining table and its subsequent unilateral postimpasse implementation.4 39
b. Circuit Court Cases Applying the Non-Statutory Exemption in
Sports
This Comment next reexamines the relevant circuit court cases in
the sports industry that have implicated the non-statutory exemption
to assess their consistency with the adversarial requirement. 44

i. Wood v. NBA 441
The result in Wood would go unchanged if the court had required
that the opposing interests in the challenged rule be adverse. The
draft and salary caps are measures that limit player choices and
By limiting total salaries, the league not only
compensation.
depresses individual salaries, but also ensures its overall
competitiveness. The draft, by assuring that the least successful teams
get the first chance to select the best of the entering players, 442 also
serves to promote the overall competitiveness of the league.
The union's interests, however, would be in opposition to the rules
because they restrict both player choice and salaries. The draft limits
the free choice of potential employees to choose where they will
practice their trade. Additionally, the aggregate team salary is an
artificial limit on spending that will deflate salaries when the market
demands increase.
ii. Mackey v. NFL 43
The Rozelle Rule fulfilled parts one and two of the Mackey test, but
The court found that there was not bona
it failed the third prong.'
bargaining
because the Rozelle Rule had been
fide arm's-length
unchanged since it was unilaterally imposed by the league prior to its
438. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
439. See supra Part I.B.2.d.
440. For the initial discussion of these cases see supra Part I.B.3.
441. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
442. NFL teams draft in an inverse order to their standing at the end of the
previous season. The team with the worst record in the league gets the first pick in
each round of the draft while the team that wins the Super Bowl gets the last pick in
each round. See NFL, Cincinnati Holds First Pick in the 2003 Draft, at
http://www.nfl.com/draft/story/6087716 (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (showing the 2003
draft order and team records).
443. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
444. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
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representation in any CBA and because there was no quid pro quo for
its inclusion in the CBA. 4 5
The court created this three-part test in order to properly
accommodate the labor and antitrust interests at stake." 6 The test,
however, does not accomplish this goal. Specifically, the third
prong-the requirement for arm's-length bargaining-overly focuses
on the procedure by which agreement was reached instead of the
agreement itself." 7 Courts will be asked to make a subjective inquiry
into whether there was a quid pro for every challenged rule.
Although this was not viewed as a negative in Mackey, it is precisely
the type of judicial determination that the Supreme Court,
subsequently in Brown, said was inappropriate to resolution of
industrial conflict." 8 It would "require... courts to answer a host of
important practical questions about how collective bargaining over
wages, hours, and working conditions is to proceed-the very result
that the implicit labor exemption seeks to avoid."" 9
The adversarial requirement, on the other hand, does not focus on
the procedure of bargaining. It does not seek to determine "in the
area of industrial conflict, what is or is not a 'reasonable' practice."45
This is a determination that the Supreme Court has directed be made
by legislative decisions and not judicial ones.451 What it does do is
'
ensure that the rule is in an "area of industrial conflict."4 52
The
adversarial requirement may dictate a different outcome in Mackey,
but this would make the case more consistent with the national labor
policy for the reasons already discussed.4" 3 In addition, the adversarial
requirement does not operate to ensure the protection provided by
the exemption when the interests are adverse, but rather to ensure its
inapplicability when the interests are not adverse.45 4
iii. Powell v. NFL455
The right of first refusal restricted players from deciding in which
geographic area to pursue their trade.
The compensation
445. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
446. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
447. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1976) (examining the
procedures of the bargaining used for the inclusion of the rule).
448. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996) (stating that the nonstatutory labor exemption "substitutes legislative and administrative labor-related
determinations for judicial antitrust-related determinations as to the appropriate legal
limits of industrial conflict").
449. Id. at 240-41.
450. Id. at 237.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. See supra Part I.B.1.
454. See supra Part III.C.1.
455. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
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requirement, however, had a more daunting effect. It made it less
attractive for teams to offer contracts to other players. In "scaring
off" teams from pursuing free agents, the former team can dictate the
salary the player has to accept. Controlling personnel costs and
ensuring that a team will keep those players it develops certainly
benefits the league. The players' interests, however, are damaged by
a rule that will limit salaries and player mobility. In the five years
after this rule was implemented, 600 players saw their contracts
expire, thus becoming free agents, but fewer than fifty signed
contracts with another team.456
Mackey and Powell are two cases about the same rule argued in the
same court. 7 Yet they came out differently due to the varying
interpretations of the procedure of bargaining that was taken in each
case. 458 Enlisting the adversarial requirement would have avoided the
inconsistent results.
45 9
iv. McCourt v. CaliforniaSports, Inc.

Although replacing the problematic Mackey test 46 with the
adversarial requirement would change the outcome in Mackey, it
would not change the decision in McCourt. Much like the NFL in
Mackey and Powell, the NHL's interest lay in controlling player
movement and salary increases that could have been gained through
the free agency system.461 Free movement, on the other hand, would
allow the marketplace to set salaries and provide players with a
legitimate opportunity to choose where they want to work. Thus, the
interests being adverse, the exemption would be applicable.
4. The Adversarial Requirement Applied to the NFL Eligibility Rule
The NFL eligibility rule did not result from collective bargaining
between two adverse parties with respect to the rule. Restricting
eligibility to players that are three years removed from their high
school graduating class benefits both the union and the league.
The NFL advanced four reasons for the eligibility rule. The rule
protects (1) the players deemed ineligible because they are not
mentally or physically mature enough to endure the rigors of the NFL;
(2) the teams from the financial damage that may result from drafting
younger players more likely to be injured; (3) the league from the
negative impact players' injuries could have on its entertainment
456. Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming The Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor
Exemption in the NationalFootball League, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1203, 1209 (1993).
457. See supra Parts I.B.3.a-b.
458. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1297-99.
459. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
460. See supra Parts I.B.3.a, III.C.3.b.ii.
461. See supra Parts III.C.3.b.ii-iii.
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product; and (4) players that would enter the draft, go undrafted, and

lose their college eligibility.462 The first three reasons revolve around
the health of the players entering the NFL, and therefore can be
addressed together.4 63 The fourth, although no more persuasive than
the first three, will garner a separate response.
If health and safety are really the concerns of the NFL, it should
institute individualized testing of players, instead of using an across
the board restriction. 6 5 The league may argue that the expense of
individualized testing makes it unrealistic and thus a bright line rule is

the only practical option. Teams and the league, however, already put
prospects through an exhaustive battery of tests, both physical and
mental, at the annual draft combine.4 66 It would not be an additional

burden for the NFL to adapt this testing, if it is not already suited, to
gauge the physical and mental ability of applicants to the draft. In
fact, the combine already includes in-depth medical tests that are

aimed at assessing both prior injuries and future durability in the

NFL.467
The stated concern for the collegiate eligibility of players that go
undrafted also seems poorly served by an across-the-board
restriction.468 A collegiate player, who does not sign with an agent,469
is allowed to enter the NFL draft once during his collegiate eligibility
and if undrafted still maintain his NCAA eligibility. 47 This is also true
462. See supra note 275.
463. See infra notes 466-67 and accompanying text.
464. See infra notes 468-72 and accompanying text.
465. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 410 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124
(2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3402 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2004) (No. 04910).
466. See Brian Ettkin, Brown Is a Giant in All Regards, Times Union (Albany,
NY), Aug. 8, 2003, at C1. The draft combine is an organized group of tests run by the
NFL to evaluate potential draft prospects. See id.
467. See Nunyo Demasio, McGahee Is Focus at NFL Combine: Ex-Miami Back
HealingAfter Surgery, Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 2003, at D4.
468. See supra note 275.
469. When a player signs with an agent he automatically loses his amateur status
and can no longer compete at the collegiate level. See NCAA, NCAA Division I
at
available
12.1.1(g),
Rule
Manual
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i-manual/2004-05/200405-dl-manual.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
470. NCAA, NCAA Division I Manual Rule 12.2.4.2.3, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i-manual/2004-05/200405-dlmanual.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). The rule states that:
An enrolled student-athlete (as opposed to a prospective student-athlete) in
the sports of Division I-A and I-AA football may enter the National
Football League draft one time during his collegiate career without
jeopardizing eligibility in that sport, provided the student-athlete is not
drafted by any team in that league and the student-athlete declares his
intention to resume intercollegiate participation within 72-hours following
the National Football League draft declaration date. The student-athlete's
declaration of intent shall be in writing to the institution's director of
athletics.
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for collegiate basketball players and the NBA draft.471 The NBA has
even created a draft advisory committee that will assess an applicant's
draft status and provide him with a prediction on when and if he will

be selected, and a recommendation on whether or not to remain in the
draft. 47 2 In fact the NFL already has a committee that advises
potential draft applicants to some degree.473 If the NFL was truly

concerned with protecting the eligibility of players that might declare
and go undrafted, it would focus on improving its draft advisory

committee.
The reason for the eligibility restriction is not a concern for the well
being of players, but rather a concern for the well being of owners'
bank accounts and team win/loss records.474 College football provides
an inexpensive system to develop players-a system in which teams
get to watch the players compete for three or four years before they
have an opportunity to draft them.475
The NFL benefits greatly from restricting access to their draft,
giving developing athletes no choice but to remain in college. The
NFL is able to watch the players for a longer time, giving them more
time to develop and mature. The fact that a rule benefits only one
Id.

471. NCAA, NCAA Division I Manual Rule 12.2.4.2.1, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division i manual/2004-05/200405_dl-manual.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005). The rule states that:
An enrolled student-athlete in basketball may enter a professional league's
draft one time during his or her collegiate career without jeopardizing
eligibility in that sport, provided the student-athlete is not drafted by any
team in that league and the student-athlete declares his or her intention to
resume intercollegiate participation within 30 days after the draft. The
student-athlete's declaration of intent shall be in writing to the institution's
director of athletics.
Id.
472. See Mark Asher, It's a Long Shot: Nonseniors Leaving School for NBA Draft
Often Can't Make the Grade,Wash. Post, May 11, 1997, at D1.
473. See id.

474. See Koch, supra note 58, at 321.
475. This can be compared to the system that exists in professional baseball where
teams have up to six minor league affiliates and many players are drafted straight out
Teams, at
of high school. See MLB, Index of Minor League
http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/minors/list.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2005);
Round
1, at
2004
First-Year
Player
Draft
Tracker:
MLB,
http//mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/y2004/trackerroundll.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2005) (stating that thirteen players in just the first round of the 2004 draft were
drafted directly out of high school). This system is not only expensive to run, but it
also forces baseball teams to draft on potential, which in some cases is never fulfilled
by the player. The teams also must take the risk that players will get seriously injured
before they ever develop to the point where they can help the Major League club. In
the NFL, a team runs a lesser risk that a high draft pick with enormous potential may
never come close to meeting that potential. Teams in the NBA routinely run this risk,
often to their detriment. See Wayne Drehs, High Risks with Drafting High School

2001,
at
Espn.go.com,
June
18,
Players,
http://espn.go.com/nba/draft2001/s/2001/0618/1215712.html; see also David Noonan &
N'Gai Croal, FastBreak to the Big Time, Newsweek, June 28, 2004, at 40.
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side of a bargaining relationship, however, is common.476 The
uniqueness of the eligibility rule is that it benefits both sides of the
relationship. The number of players that, at any one time, can play in
the NFL is capped due to roster limits for the member teams.477
Therefore, the addition of new players necessitates the elimination of
existing ones. As such, the bargaining power of the union is inelastic;
there will be the same number of players in the league with or without
the eligibility rule. The union gets to protect current players at no
cost to their overall bargaining power.478
The NFL also has a hard salary cap that limits what each team can
spend on its aggregate payroll. 479 Generally, teams spend right up to
the cap.480 Younger players entering the league therefore should have
no effect on the aggregate salary made by players. The rule may
change the distribution of that salary pool,48 1 but it will not decrease

the pool. As such the union can again direct benefits to its current
members without hurting its overall position in the industry.
However, the union does have an interest in keeping these young
players out of the league. Unions commonly act to the benefit of their

current or senior members. 482 Because the NFL presents a unique
situation where the addition of one employee necessitates the

476. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996). In Brown, the
uniform wage for development squad players benefited the NFL, but not the union
and the players. See also Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). The Rozelle
Rule, at issue in Powell, benefited the league by controlling player movement and
salaries. See also Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). In Wood, the NBA
draft and salary cap benefited the league by controlling player salaries and
maintaining competitive balance by controlling the dispersal of new employees.
477. NFL team rosters are capped at fifty-three players. See NFLPA, NFL-NFLPA
§ 4, available at
Article
XXXIII
Bargaining Agreement
Collective
http://nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art30 (last visited Feb.
12, 2005).
478. In most situations, restricting potential employees from entering the market
would be adverse to the interests of the unions. Unions normally want new
employees because it signifies the strength of the industry and results in increased
bargaining power for the union.
479. The cap is described as a hard cap because teams are not allowed to exceed
the cap for any reason, and any contract that exceeds the cap can be voided by the
commissioner and result in steep penalties. See NFLPA, NFL-NFLPA Collective
at
available
6(a)-(b),
§
XXV
Article
Agreement
Bargaining
http://nflpa.org/Members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete#art25 (last visited Feb.
9, 2005). Penalties can include fines of up to $3.5 million against the team and
$250,000 against club executives, as well as a potential forfeiture of draft choices. Id.
480. See Mike O'Hara, Salary-Cap Restriction Squeezing NFL Rosters, Detroit
News, May 29, 2001, at El (describing numerous NFL players that are getting cut
from their teams due to the lack of room under the salary cap).
481. Young players generally make lower salaries than veteran players. See Len
Pasquarelli, Rookie Pool Providing Little Room for Pay Increases, Espn.go.com, June
26, 2003, at http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/pasquarellilen/1573188.html. This may
reflect the risk that rookies may never live up to their potential. It also redirects
portions of available dollars under the salary cap from rookies to veteran players. See
id.
482. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987).
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elimination of another, the eligibility rule benefits the members of the
union. Each time a483new player enters the league an existing union
member must exit it.
Both sides benefit from the NFL's eligibility rule. The league gets
to take advantage of an already existing cheap and efficient system of
developing players and the union is able to preserve the job status of
its members in an employment context with a limited number of
jobs. 4' As such, the adversarial requirement would preclude the
application of the non-statutory exemption and leave the challenged
rule open to antitrust liability.
The fact that the union and the league both stand to benefit from
the imposition of the eligibility requirement alters the bargaining
relationship. Instead of parties sitting at opposing sides of the table
resolving issues on which they differ, the parties are sitting on the
same side of the table. This is not the type of situation that prior
Supreme Court precedent or the NLRA seeks to protect.
Examination of the NLRA itself and Supreme Court case law
makes clear that the NLRA does not classify an eligibility restriction
as a mandatory subject. However, even if it did, the court should
adopt the adversarial approach proposed herein and pair it with its
existing jurisprudence mandating the use of the "rule of reason." The
use of the "rule of reason" will allow, in some cases, a challenged rule
that does not invoke the protection of the exemption to nonetheless
remain legal.48 6
CONCLUSION

Maurice Clarett has chosen the profession that he wishes to pursue,
yet he is being prevented from realizing this dream. The NFL is not
preventing him from competing based on inability or lack of talent,
but rather on how long it has been since he graduated high school.
The NFL's eligibility rule at issue in Clarett is an illegal restraint of
trade. The NFL can not be allowed to invoke the non-statutory
exemption to shield its eligibility rule from the Sherman Act. The rule
does not represent a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, nor
does it "vitally affect" one. Furthermore, the eligibility rule would fail
to meet the proposed adversarial requirement to the non-statutory
483. The mere fact that the union has an interest should not be mistaken for the
interest necessary to vitally affect a mandatory subject of bargaining. See supra notes
383-87 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 474-83 and accompanying text.
485. See supra Part II.B.1.
486. Rules that truly promote employee safety by declaring ineligible employees
that have serious health conditions that pose risks to themselves and others would
remain legal as reasonable restraints on competition. See Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d
1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that an NHL rule banning players with sight in only
one eye was legal, analyzing the rule under antitrust principles, rejecting a per se
approach, and finding that the rule was reasonable as promoting safety).
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exemption. If the non-statutory exemption is inapplicable then the
eligibility rule must be evaluated under the antitrust laws. Thus, the
NFL's rule should fail the rule of reason and be deemed a violation of
the Sherman Act.

